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Abstract
Can institutionalized transfers of resource rents be a source of civil conflict?
Are cohesive institutions better in managing distributive conflicts? We study
these questions exploiting exogenous variation in revenue disbursements to
local governments together with new data on local democratic institutions in
Nigeria. We make three contributions. First, we document the existence of a
strong link between rents and conflict far away from the location of the actual
resource. Second, we show that distributive conflict is highly organized involv-
ing political militias and concentrated in the extent to which local governments
are non-cohesive. Third, we show that democratic practice in form having
elected local governments significantly weakens the causal link between rents
and political violence. We document that elections (vis-a-vis appointments), by
producing more cohesive institutions, vastly limit the extent to which distribu-
tional conflict between groups breaks out following shocks to the available
rents. Throughout, we confirm these findings using individual level survey
data.
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1 Introduction
The peaceful division of scarce resources between groups in a society is one
of the key distinguishing features of functioning and successful states. An impor-
tant ingredient to managing the resource allocation problem is a country’s political
system and its cohesiveness – capturing the extent to which different groups in
society are meaningfully represented and engaged with political processes. A lack
of cohesive institutions has been identified as a central feature that may explain the
emergence of fragile and low income development clusters (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2012; Besley and Persson, 2011a).
Natural resource rents – relative to other sources of government revenue – are
particularly vulnerable to cause violence through a multitude of channels (Col-
lier and Hoeffler, 1998; Caselli et al., 2015; Berman et al., 2017). What distinguishes
natural resource rents from other government revenues is that these rents are wind-
fall profits that mostly directly accrue to the state as opposed to being indirectly
sourced through taxation. Windfall profits encourage rent-seeking behavior and
this contesting of rents may or may not involve violence (van der Ploeg, 2011).
Rather than fostering broad development, resource wealth is often associated with
repressive regimes, rentier states and clientelism (Brollo et al., 2013; Besley and
Persson, 2011b; Carreri and Dube, 2017).
Understanding how the institutional setup in a country is able to shape and
peacefully resolve the challenges that resource windfalls may pose is of signifi-
cant importance. An understanding of why some countries are being cursed by
their endowments can help to inform the design of robust institutions (Ross, 2015).
This paper makes headway in providing an in-depth analysis of the interactions
between institutions, resource rents and the incidence of political violence. Lever-
aging the theoretical framework of Besley and Persson (2011b), we study three re-
lated questions. First, do large windfalls of politically controlled natural resource
rents encourage the use of violence to contest or enforce the exclusion from these
rents? Second, are elected (vis-a-vis appointed) local governments more successful
in discouraging the use of violence to contest rents? Third, to what extent does
variation in the degree of cohesiveness that these different institutional setups gen-
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erate, explain why violence is being used to contest rents in one, but not the other
regime.
In answering these questions, we provide ample evidence in support of the
overall theoretical predictions of Besley and Persson (2011b). Further, we present
significant evidence in support of an important hypothesis that has been left un-
explored: do cohesive institutions discourage the use of political violence? Besley
and Persson (2011b)’s theoretical results strongly depend on a single model param-
eter capturing the extent to which institutions are constraining incumbents. Less
cohesion implies that more resources are being diverted away from common pub-
lic goods, and towards patronage and clientelism, generating a unique value for
a group to holding political power. Through this channel, investments in political
violence to retain power (incumbent) or gain access to it (opposition) can be ra-
tionalized. With fully cohesive institutions, the sharp theoretical predictions break
down: the more cohesive institutions are, the less likely are revenue shocks to in-
duce investments in violence. The central role that the cohesiveness of institutions
plays has not been investigated empirically in a convincing manner due to a lack
of time-variation in institutions. This paper fills this gap.1
There are at least three main challenges to find a suitable context that maps well
into the overall theoretical framework, while allowing for a sharp and fairly clean
test of the theoretical predictions. First, natural resources can cause conflict through
a multitude of direct and indirect channels posing a significant challenge for non-
experimental studies to causally identify and quantify the relevance of any individ-
ual channel.2 Second, there exist few cases where countries exhibit significant and
meaningful variation in their institutional setup that are not confounded with other
concurrent changes. Such broader sweeping institutional changes, for example
brought about by democratization, are compound treatments, which fuzz the abil-
ity to distinguish independent effects that specific institutional features may have
1While cross-sectional variation across countries is being used to estimate heterogenous effects
in Besley and Persson (2011b), they leave a test of their important Corollary 4 to future research.
2To give a sense for the multitude of channels, the existing literature has suggested – among
others – that natural resources encourage inter-state conflict (Caselli et al., 2015), secession (Morelli
and Rohner, 2015), improve the feasibility of rebellion (Berman et al., 2017); other channels explored
are due to the negative externalities of resource extraction (Sexton, 2018; Humphreys, 2005) and a
lack of transparency around extraction activity (Christensen, 2017).
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in isolation. Third, measuring and identifying the degree of cohesiveness of polit-
ical institutions is not trivial. While political institutions may seem non-cohesive
from the outset along certain dimensions such as religion, ethnicity or identity, the
extent to which the public actually perceives institutions as non-cohesive along such
dimensions depends on the extent to which society is polarized along these fault
lines to begin with.
We argue that Nigeria provides a unique context that allows us to navigate these
challenges in a comprehensive fashion. First, we exploit Nigeria’s system of oil
revenue sharing across layers of government. This has several key advantages. On
the empirical side, this is appealing as the revenue sharing follows a fixed rule and
the size of transfers are essentially guided by the movements of world oil prices.
Further, the spatial concentration of oil wealth in the South of the country allows
us to cleanly isolate the effect that institutionalized rents have on political violence
at the local level. Hence, it is not confounded by any direct effects of extraction
activity on violence. Lastly, on the conceptual side, the revenue sharing matches
a key tenet of the theoretical model in Besley and Persson (2011b): resource rents
directly accrue to the incumbent government, generating an asymmetry between
incumbent and opposition over access to rents.3
Second, Nigeria allows us to exploit variation in the extent of local democratic
practice within country and even within constitution over time due to existence of rich
and quite idiosyncratic variation in the extent to which local governments are ap-
pointed or democratically elected (while holding constant the overall institutional
setup). Lastly, we can leverage the fact that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society in
which politics is significantly influenced by ethnic affiliation of population groups
(Alesina et al., 2016; Hodler and Raschky, 2014).
Our findings are threefold. First, consistent with the theoretical prediction in
Besley and Persson (2011b), we document a significant and economically sizeable
link between resource rents and the incidence of political violence. These effects
are driven by positive shocks to resource rents. The ensuing low-intensity conflict
3On the relevance of how this asymmetry may affect the dynamics of civil conflict, see e.g.
Andersen et al. (2017) who exploit the variation that off-shore versus on-shore oil and gas revenues
have on government versus rebel fighting capacity, or Vanden Eynde (2015) who documents that
Indian state governments are more likely to engage in fighting an insurgency if they obtain a higher
share of the mineral resource revenues that the insurgency contests.
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is highly institutionalized involving government repression and militias using tar-
geted violence, but not broad, open rebellions embroiling riots or protests. The
finding suggests that revenue sharing – an institutional feature common to eleven
African countries (NRGI/UNDP, 2016) – implies a novel type of resource-induced con-
flict: while violence may be used to voice grievances or contest the allocation of
resources, the patterns are inconsistent with all-out civil war, which is not surpris-
ing given that civil war may compromise access the rents in the first place (e.g.
secession of non-oil producing areas is not a credible contest goal). Revenue shar-
ing, thus, may exacerbate latent low intensity distributional conflicts in places far
removed from physical resources, yet, this conflict, as we show, is driven by places
where governance is weak and institutions are non-cohesive.
Second, we find that having an elected local government systematically weak-
ens the link between rents and the incidence of political conflict. Rather than focus-
ing on any individual election – which may be prone to violence directly affecting
its outcome (Long et al., 2017) – we contrast consecutive episodes over which lo-
cal governments are elected (as opposed to appointed) and study the systematic
link between shocks to rents and violence across such episodes. Our identification
strategy allows us to tackle many plausible endogeneity concerns, while providing
sharp results that match key theoretical predictions in Besley and Persson (2011b).
Further, while our main results are derived from the widely used ACLED conflict
data (and other common conflict data sets), we also turn to individual level micro data
to corroborate our findings, documenting that fear of political violence, actual vic-
timization, and even engagement in conflict broadly follows the pattern suggested
by the aggregate data. Given the still limited availability of data in the African
context, we feel this cross-check is speaking to the overall robustness of our results
(Berman and Matanock, 2015).
Having an elected local government can affect political violence through a mul-
titude of channels. Our third set of findings highlights that – consistent with the
theoretical predictions – the higher degree of cohesiveness of institutions that elections
(vis-a-vis appointments) produce seem to drive the results. We construct a mea-
sure of non-cohesiveness capturing the extent to which an area’s population’s eth-
nic makeup is aligned with the ethnicity of the state governor. We provide ample
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anecdotal evidence suggesting that, when local governments are appointed, these
appointments are skewed towards the ethnicity of the state governor. We validate
this measure using individual level micro data and document that the link between
political violence and resource rents are strongly driven by this measure of non-
alignment – but only when local governments are appointed, not when they are
elected.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, we relate to the lit-
erature studying the important link between natural resources and civil conflict.4
Dube and Vargas (2013)’s seminal paper studies civil conflict in Colombia compar-
ing oil producing versus coffee producing municipalities finding strong evidence
in support of the opportunity cost mechanism; Sanchez de la Sierra (2015) studies
violence in coltan and gold mining regions in Congo; Berman et al. (2017) study re-
source related conflict in Africa around fine spatial grid cells with mining activity,
while Caselli et al. (2015) focus on interstate conflict over natural resources. Bazzi
and Blattman (2014) provide an overview of the literature exploiting commodity
price shocks to study conflicts, Ciccone (2018) provides new cross-country evi-
dence and asks important questions around the construction of commodity price
shock measures, while Blattman and Miguel (2010) review the broader literature on
civil war. Our paper differs as we document a new type of resource conflict affecting
regions far away from the physical location of the resource due to the institutional-
ized sharing of resource revenues. This observation highlights a potential problem
for empirical designs studying conflict over physical control of the resource across
space: the sharing of revenues implies a form of spillovers that violates the non-
interference assumption inherent to the difference-in-difference estimation designs
used in this literature.
We further relate to the literature that understands how institutions – in par-
ticular, democracy – may shape development outcomes more broadly and civil
conflict, more specifically. On the former, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2014) find that
the introduction of local village elections in China increased public goods expen-
4A large literature studies the natural resource curse in terms of economic growth and develop-
ment. Some of papers that substantiated this strand of the literature are Sachs and Warner (1995),
Sachs and Warner (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2014) and more recently Cust and Mihalyi (2017) and
Harding et al. (2017). A literature overview is provided in Arezki et al. (2011).
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diture financed by villagers, caused a moderate decline in income inequality, and
likely reduced corruption, while Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) suggest that elite cap-
ture may persist through democratic transitions. On the latter, Collier and Rohner
(2008) suggest that democracy, due to the possibility of violence having an elec-
toral costs, may be constraining the use of force. On the other hand, the act of
holding elections may itself be encouraging violence to affect turnout (Collier and
Vicente, 2014; Eifert et al., 2010; Long et al., 2017). Natural resource rents may
have further effects on political outcomes, not necessarily involving violence in
the form we document here. Bru¨ckner et al. (2012) document in a cross-country
panel setup that positive oil price shocks are followed by moderate improvements
in democratic institutions (measured using the Polity-2 dataset), while Caselli and
Tesei (2016) suggest that resource windfalls make autocratic regimes even more
autocratic, while not affecting democratic countries. The concern with this work
is the multitude of channels through which these effects could operate. This high-
lights the value of working with subnational data exploiting time variation in a
specific democratic institution, while holding constant the overall institutional con-
text, as we are able to do in this paper. Yet, it also raises the concern that our
subnational time-variation in transition to and from having elected governments
may be endogenous to commodity price cycles. We find no evidence for this to
be the case as local governments transition in and out of having elected local gov-
ernments quite unsystematically. Lastly, there is also a literature that exploits time
variation in resource shocks on the quality of institutions holding the overall in-
stitutional framework fixed. Carreri and Dube (2017) show how oil price shocks
affect which type of political candidate is being elected in oil-producing municipal-
ities in Colombia, while Brollo et al. (2013) study how additional resource revenues
accruing to a government induce corruption. This paper does not focus on the
direct effects that elections themselves may have on conflict – we can simply dis-
card data around individual elections – but rather, how the institution of having an
elected local government can systematically moderate the violent contest over politi-
cal rents. We show that the most likely channel through which having an elected
local government reduces conflict dynamics is due to the broader representation of
ethnic groups in government that elections (vis-a-vis appointments) produce. We
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stay clear from making normative statements about whether elections are better for
a simple reason: we lack alternative counterfactuals. For example, it may be that
local governments run by merit-based recruited bureaucrats may produce better
(or worse) outcomes (Bertrand et al., 2017).
We also relate to the growing literature on ethnic politics in Africa in general,
and on power sharing as an institution in particular. Francois et al. (2015) describe
how power is shared among African ethnic groups represented by cabinet positions
at the central government level as a result of outside threats such as revolutions or
coups. They document a strong degree of proportionality between ministerial po-
sitions and ethnic group population shares. Eifert et al. (2010) find ethnic identities
to become stronger before elections, when political competition intensifies. Fur-
thermore, ethnic and regional favoritism are used by politicians to please their
constituencies (Burgess et al., 2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014), which may result
in significant between ethnic group inequality (Alesina et al., 2016). Power sharing
more generally has been suggested to be an important driver of the peace process
in Northern Ireland (Mueller and Rohner, 2017). Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggests
that ethnic diversity is not associated with a higher civil conflict incidence, Rohner
et al. (2013a) document that conflict reduces inter-ethnic trust, while the theoretical
model in Rohner et al. (2013b) suggests that measures fostering inter-ethnic trust
and trade may be effective in avoiding a vicious cycle of conflict. More recently
Bazzi and Gudgeon (2015) suggest for Indonesia, that increasing public resources
can increase conflict particularly in ethnically polarized areas.
Lastly, there is a small literature on Nigeria. Sala-i Martin and Subramanian
(2013) suggests that Nigeria’s institutions are negatively affected by the oil wealth
undermining growth; a more historic account of oil wealth and violence is given
by Azam (2009), while Collier and Vicente (2014) examine how voter intimidation
is effective in reducing voter turnout. Fenske and Zurimendi (2017) provides ev-
idence on the long-run effects of oil wealth increasing inequality; analyzing state
capacity, Rasul and Rogger (2017) investigate how management practices in the
Nigerian public sector, such as autonomy of the bureaucrat as well as incentives
and monitoring, affect service delivery.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
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ground on the institutional setup and discusses the data used. Section 3 examines
whether political rents induce conflict. We then proceed in Section 4 to study
whether having an elected local government weakens this link. Section 5 provides
evidence of the underlying mechanism. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Context and a First Look at the Data
We first discuss the Nigerian context and introduce our main data. We focus on
three things: first, we describe the system of revenue sharing, second, we provide
an account of local governance in Nigeria and third, we discuss the observed vio-
lence and introduce our measures of conflict. A more extensive discussion of the
institutional and the socio-econonomic context can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Fiscal federalism, resources and political rents
Nigeria is organized as a Federation of States as per the Nigerian Constitution
of 1999. The constitution stipulates a system of revenue sharing between the three
tiers of government (federal, state and local governments) according to a fixed
formula. The collected revenues are comprised of oil production tax and value-
added tax (VAT) revenues. Oil revenues though make up the most significant
share of government revenues and are important for public finances at all levels of
government: in 2013 oil revenues accounted for 75% of all revenues (World Bank,
2013). At the local level, transfers due to revenue sharing accounts for the vast
majority of funds: almost 90% of gross revenues available to local governments
is due to disbursements from the federation account (World Bank, 2013).5 The
exogenously sourced monthly allocations to local governments thus constitute the
main source of political rents.
The revenue sharing system stipulates that, of the gross total of public sector
revenues, 20.60% are allocated to local governments, 26.72% are allocated to the
states, and 52.68% are allocated to the federal government (vertical formula).6 Of
5Local governments have limited ability to raise revenues. Ekpo and Englama (2008) documents
that they usually raise less than 5% of gross revenues with the main source of non-transfer revenues
is property tax and market and trading licenses.
6The oil producing states receive 13% percent of oil revenues directly, called the Derivation
Principle. Our results are robust to excluding the oil producing states wholly from the analysis.
Similarly, in our empirical setup we control for state by time fixed effects, which effectively accounts
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the 20.6% allocated to local governments, each of the 774 local governments has
a specific weight ωi, whereby ∑i ωi = 1 (horizontal formula). These weights are
essentially time-invariant and fixed at a baseline year.7 Table 1 highlights that pop-
ulation and landmass are driving the cross-sectional variation in the index weights
ωi. This results in rich cross-sectional variation in the index weights used across
the country which are visually displayed in panel A of Figure 1.
We digitize data on the monthly allocations along with the index weights used
in the allocation formula from the Federation Account Allocation Committee at the
Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance. This data is assembled to provide us with a
monthly balanced panel of allocations across all 774 local government areas for the
period June 1999 to July 2014. Variation in the monthly allocations is mostly driven
by the variation in oil prices as the amount of oil produced is quite stable over our
sample period.8
The actual allocations are separated into statutory and extraordinary allocations.
Importantly, both these allocation respect the set of fixed index weights ωi, which
determine the individual shares of total revenues that each local government re-
ceives. The statutory allocations are regular monthly disbursals calculated based
on a benchmark oil price that tracks the spot market price at a discount and are
triggered automatically. Revenues that accrue due to the difference between the
spot market and benchmark price are accumulated in the Excess Crude Account.
Extraordinary allocations are disbursed irregularly from the Excess Crude Account
and based on idiosyncratic political decisions. These allocations can usually be
traced back to periods when significant fiscal buffers were accumulated.9 The over-
all allocations are hence the monthly combination of statutory and extraordinary
allocation. In the empirical exercises, we focus on the statutory allocations, but use
in a non-parametric fashion for the state specific variation in transfers.
7Over our sample period, the allocation formula changed very slightly in August 2006 and then
again in October 2013, when there was again another slight change in the allocation weights.
8Appendix Table A2 provides a formal decomposition of the variance in allocations highlighting
that the bulk of variation is explained by price (as opposed to quantity) variation.
9The benchmark price usually tracks the spot market price at a discount resulting in accumula-
tion of fiscal buffer. We describe this in further detail in section ?? in the appendix. Appendix Table
A1 presents a decomposition of within and between LGA variation for these different types of allo-
cations (overall, statutory, and extraordinary allocations) indicating that the within-LGA variation
accounts for the major part of the overall variation in allocations.
10
the extraordinary allocations for robustness checks. Panels B in Figure 1 present
the statutory allocations against the oil price over time.
2.2 Local political institutions
As per the constitution of Nigeria, local governments should result out of local
council elections to be held every three years. Local councils consist of a number of
Councillors and a Chairman selected from among the Councillors. The local gov-
ernment councils have substantial responsibilities over the provision of education,
health care services, and policies to foster local economic development, but have es-
sentially no independent revenue raising capacity and are reliant on transfers from
the central government. While the constitution stipulates that local government
councils must be elected by the people, state governments have are responsible to
organize and finance the local government elections.
The first local council elections in the transition from military to democratic
rule were held in November/December 1998. The first term of the initially elected
local councils came to an end in May 2002. At that time, confusion emerged as
the national voter register used in the 1999 elections had not yet been updated to
possibly hold new elections.10 In June 2002, state governors appointed commit-
tees to (temporarily) run the local governments, called “transition committees”.
Ever since that decisive moment in 2002 when committees across the country were
appointed, elections of local councils became a political controversy.11 In the sub-
sequent years, state governors started to exploit their idiosyncratic political power
to postpone or cancel local elections altogether. As a consequence, many local gov-
ernment councils ceased to be elected bodies, and became appointed bodies. This
results in significant de-facto variation in local political institutions across Nigeria
that we exploit in this paper.
The cohesiveness of local governments depends, inter alia, on whether local
councils are elected by the people or appointed by the state governor. We presume
and provide ample anecdotal and empirical evidence that local government council
10A supreme court ruling in 2002 proclaimed that local government elections should not to be
held until the voter register was updated (reported e.g. in the newspaper This Day, May 8 2002).
11See Kyburz (2017) for a more detailed description of the controversy surrounding local gov-
ernment council elections and the appointment of caretaker committees.
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elections improve the inclusion of various constituencies in the governing process.
Meanwhile appointments made by the state governor appear to maximize control
over local governments and the distributions of perks to cronies. Panel A of Figure
2 displays the variation in the overall time that areas have an elected local govern-
ment council between 1999 to 2014, while Panel B presents the time-series variation
capturing the share of local governments that are elected in a specific point in time.
An in-depth discussion of local government responsibilities and council elections
is provided in Appendix A.3.
We draw data on the conduct of local government council elections or appoint-
ment of so-called “transition” or “caretaker” committees from a media content
analysis using Nigerian newspapers, presented in more detail in Kyburz (2017).
Since official information on local councils is not available we rely on local news-
papers from which we extract information on local government council elections.12
In particular, we extract information for each of the 774 local government areas on
the dates when local elections were held, the period of tenure of elected councils,
and the periods in which appointed committees were in power.
In our empirical analysis, we use the de facto variation in the ‘state of democracy’
at the local level to analyze whether having an elected local government has a
pacifying effect on civil violence described in the following subsection. We do
not focus on any individual election, but rather focus on consecutive periods in
which local governments are elected (as opposed to appointed). We code a dummy
variable that captures whether a local council is elected (Elected = 1) or appointed
as caretaker committee by the state governor (Elected = 0).
Political control over the local government represents an important source of
political rents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rents are often used for pa-
tronage, which again may generate economic grievances for marginalized groups.
These grievances are likely pronounced in cases where local governments do not
have electoral incentives to share the rents with the local population through the
provision of common public goods (Besley and Persson, 2011b). Because of the
high volatility in oil prices, the flow of allocations into local accounts is both hard
12Most information is extracted from Nigerian newspapers This Day/All Africa Global Media, Daily
Champion/All Africa Global Media, Vanguard/All Africa Global Media, Daily Trust/All Africa Global Media,
and Daily Independent/All Africa Global Media.
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to predict and opens the floodgates to misappropriate public funds. There are nu-
merous accounts of mismanagement of public funds, lowering trust in the local
governments and creating grievances among the population. Cancelling elections
and appointing committees instead is likely to re-enforce these grievances and to
lead to hostilities between political interest groups.13
Grievances among the population and cleavages between ethnic groups may
further intensify when politicians use ethnic identities to distribute perks. Peri-
ods of non-elected caretaker governments presumably exacerbate the prevalence
of ethnic politics as state governors are likely to appoint co-ethnic cronies (Burgess
et al., 2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014). In a regime with appointed local govern-
ments, the non-aligned ethnic groups thus may realize to be excluded from any
political rents. They possibly resort to violence to contest the control of the local
government and improve their bargaining power vis-a-vis the group in power. On
the other hand, the group in power may use violence and repression to exclude
opposition groups from accessing rents. We provide both anecdotal and empirical
evidence for the relevance of these mechanisms in Section 5, and moreover use
micro-data to corroborate our findings. Elected local governments, by virtue of
being more inclusive, make political institutions more cohesive and significantly
reduce the incidence of resource-rent induced conflict by fostering broader sharing
of the rents.
2.3 Political violence
Nigeria is in a state of low-intensity conflict. Generally small scale violent events
cause numerous casualties each year all over the country. We propose that these
kinds conflicts are — to a large extent — contests between political factions for the
control over local governments. The control of local government councils brings
with it the perks of the allocations from the Federation Account. While in some
local government areas, the distribution of institutionalized resource rents may be
resolved through peaceful means, in other cases rivalrous political groups fight
using physical intimidation, violent repression and force to gain access to rents.
13In appendix A.1, we provide a detailed description of the public finance management at the
local government level and how the erratic nature of revenue allocations may facilitate embezzle-
ment.
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The variation in conflict across Nigeria that we use in our empirical analysis
is displayed in Figure 3, indicating the number of violent events for each of the
774 local government areas over the period 1999 to 2014. Civil conflict data over
the entire sample period is drawn from the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED).14 Raleigh and Dowd (2015) provide a detailed description
of variables and coding methodology. The ACLED project provides details of geo-
graphic locations of conflict events, in terms of latitude and longitude, dates, and
additional information on the actors involved. In particular, it codes the actions
of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, allowing an analysis of
the local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict.
We provide detailed anecdotal evidence on this low-intensity conflicts between
political groups in Appendix A.2. Accounts of violence related to the contest over
resource rents, disbursed to local governments as monthly allocations, are abun-
dant. Violence is reported to be associated with the misconduct of local govern-
ment chairmen, mismanagement of local public finances such as omission of pay-
ing salaries, or the embezzlement of public funds, and their failure to provide
education and health care services. The acts of fraud are used to mobilize and
provoke violent reactions by opposing political groups who want to contest their
share of the pie. Importantly, we will see that this violence is concentrated around
positive shocks to political rents and does not seem to involve mass-mobilization involv-
ing protests and riots, but rather involve violence orchestrated by the incumbent
resorting to the military and political militia groups.
Violent clashes between political factions may also happen around the time
of local elections. We indeed report a significant increase in civil violence in the
month leading up to local elections, and the month of the election itself, as depicted
in Figure A4 in the appendix. Our results, as we will show in detail, are not driven
by election related violence, but rather occur systematically within periods of the
different regimes.
We now proceed to provide causal empirical evidence on the violent contest
14The ACLED conflict events data is available at https://www.acleddata.com/. We use alter-
native conflict data to check the robustness of our results. Specifically, we also employ data from
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset, available at http://ucdp.uu.se/,
and the Global Terrorism Database GTD, available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
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over institutionalized rents, and how more cohesive political institutions alleviate
the link between resources and conflict.
3 Do Resource Rents Induce Conflict?
We first present evidence that institutionalized resource rents are causing politi-
cal violence. To be able to contrast with our later analysis, we restrict the estimating
sample to only include those time periods in which local councils are appointed.
3.1 Empirical strategy
Our estimation strategy consists of both an ordinary least squares as well as
an instrumental variables estimation approach. Equation 1 presents our baseline
specification,
yjst = αj + γ× Allocjst + δst + ε jst (1)
where the dependent variable yjst indicates the incidence of conflict in local govern-
ment area j, state s, and month t. Allocjst are the monthly revenue disbursements
to a local government area.15 Throughout, we control for LGA-specific fixed effects,
αj, and more importantly state-by-time fixed effects, δst. While we obtain very sim-
ilar results using less demanding specifications, the inclusion of state-by-time fixed
effects is appealing for two reasons: first, states participate in the revenue sharing
and thus, controlling for state by time fixed effects flexibly controls for the extent
to which resources flow into the state (as opposed to LGA’s); second, they remove
any state-specific non-linear conflict trends.
Our central coefficient of interest is γ. We expect this coefficient to be positive,
γ > 0, indicating that positive shocks to rents increase the incidence of repression
and political violence. In the context of the theoretical model of Besley and Persson
(2011b), the mechanism is simple: higher amounts of rents accruing to the incum-
bent government, all else constant, increases the value of holding political power
for the incumbent (and to gain political power for the opposition) as this entails the
ability to divert resources through transfers to the own group if institutions are not
15Appendix Tables A3, A4 and A5 highlight our results are robust to alternative temporal reso-
lutions, working with intensity (as opposed to incidence) measures and other estimation methods
to account for the count data nature. We prefer the monthly resolution as this allows us to directly
address concerns that our estimates are affected by increased conflict around elections.
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cohesive. As a result, the incumbent as well as the opposition invest in violence.
In addition to the OLS estimation, we also use an instrumental variable ap-
proach to counter any endogeneity or measurement concerns in the allocations
disbursed to the local governments every month. Equation 2 represents the first-
stage specification. The central input to the revenue sharing formula is the variable
ωj, which captures a local authority area’s share in the overall revenue allocation
and is decomposed as presented in Table 1. The second ingredient is a measure of
the Oil pricet which drives the bulk of the variation in overall revenues.
Allocjst = αj + pi ×ωj ×Oil pricet + δst + x′jstβ+ ε jst (2)
The second stage takes the instrumented allocations ̂Allocationsjst as regressors,
with a conflict measure yjst as dependent variable. In particular, the estimated
specification becomes:
yjst = αj + γ× Âllocjst + δst + x′jstβ+ ε jst (3)
The underlying identifying assumption for γ in specification 3, representing the
causal effect of natural resource rents on conflict, is that there is no other indirect
way by which the interaction between ωj × Oil pricet affects conflict other than
through the allocations. This would be a concern if there were other transfers
or government schemes that are linked to the specific ωj used for the revenue
allocations. Alternatively, a concern would be if oil price shocks had a further
differential effect on e.g. economic activity in different locations that is not captured
through the interaction with the allocation weight.
As we will show, the revenue sharing formula is followed very closely, so that
one can question the necessity of an instrumental approach. Therefore, we do not
show IV estimation coefficients throughout all result tables to preserve space. We
next present the results.
3.2 Results
The main results from this analysis focusing on the periods in which local gov-
ernments are appointed are presented in Table 2. The table includes outcomes from
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both the OLS as well as the instrumental variable estimation exercises. Substan-
tively, the results in Table 2 demonstrate a significant and considerable relationship
between civil conflict measures, as reported in the ACLED database, and inflows
of resource revenues during periods when local governments are appointed. The
effects are sizeable: the point estimate in column (1) suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in allocations is associated with a more than doubling of the
conflict event incidence relative to the average incidence, implying that revenue
sharing and the involved rents are a major source of political violence and contest.
Columns (2) – (4) study the three types of events covered in ACLED: “battles” –
involving any interaction between organized combatants, “violence against civil-
ians”, and “protests/riots”. We see that rents are most strongly associated with
increasing the incidence of battles and violence against civilians, while we observe
a null result for protests and riots, which we will discuss further below.
Columns (4) – (8) cover the groups involved in conflict, distinguishing between
the military, political militias, communal militias, and rebels. The results indicate
that the effects are mostly driven by conflict events involving the military, political
and communal militias, while they are not driven by rebel violence. The latter is
quite a telling null result: rebel groups, as per ACLED’s definition are “political
organizations whose goal is to counter an established national governing regime
by violent acts [...] with a stated political agenda for national power (either through
regime replacement or separatism)”. Yet, as we argued earlier, secession is not a
viable contest goal for the vast majority of Nigeria that is non-oil producing, as
secession would cut these areas off from further transfers. A null result here is,
thus, not surprising. Lastly, in columns (9) – (10) we further decompose column
(6), to study between which actors conflict unfolds: most events involve political
militias either fighting the military or targeting civilians.
As becomes clear from comparing the OLS and the IV results (Panel A and B,
respectively), there is limited need for instrumenting in the first place since the
gross statutory allocations are almost fully explained by the interaction term. The
weak-IV test statistic is far from any levels that would merit concern regarding the
weakness of the instrument.16 Since the allocation rule is being tightly followed
16This is not surprising as in Appendix Table A2, we see that the R2 of the de-facto first stage
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and the OLS and IV results are very similar throughout, going forward, in order to
keep the presentation of the results dense, we do not report the IV estimates.
3.3 Robustness
Our baseline results are robust to a battery of checks. We obtain very similar
results when varying the temporal resolution of our data to be quarterly or annually
instead of monthly in Table A3, or when considering alternative transformations of
our conflict measures to measure plain conflict levels, per capita measures or loga-
rithmic transformations in Table A4. Further, we show that our results are robust
to alternative functional forms in Table A5. We obtain very similar results when esti-
mating Poisson, negative-binomial or plain OLS on event counts. Similarly, we can
flexibly control for the individual subcomponents of the revenue sharing formula
weights in Table A6. We also document that we obtain very similar results using
different conflict data altogether in Table A7, where we draw in the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program data set, as well as the Global Terrorism Database, and remove
Boko-Haram conflict events from ACLED to illustrate that the effects are not driven
by this particular conflict. Finally, we also check whether extraordinary allocations
that are triggered when fiscal buffers accumulate (while still following the alloca-
tion rule), have a different effect on conflict – finding no evidence that this is the
case in Table A8.
Any differential effect in oil producing areas? In Appendix Table A9 we explore
whether the link between resource rent and conflict in LGAs in states that produce
oil (Panel A) or LGAs that have a known oil field (Panel B). There is only limited
evidence of a slightly weaker relationship between resource rents and conflict in
areas that are (likely) produce oil. This suggests that the conflict we capture is
indeed over the institutionally distributed natural resource rents and not primarily
a conflict over the control of the actual physical source of the resource wealth.
Discussion The analysis hitherto suggests that resource revenue sharing may it-
self be associated with instability and violence in areas far removed from the actual
location of oil production. We believe that we are the first to document this insti-
reaches 98%. The specification without time and location fixed effects reaches an R2 of 86%, sug-
gesting that the allocation rule is very closely followed.
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tutionalized spillover effect.17 This has broader implications. Revenue sharing, which
is quite common across the world, may imply a violation to the non-interference
assumption inherent to papers exploiting difference-in-difference designs compar-
ing natural resource producing areas to those that don’t. Further, the conflict that
we document is institutionalized – not involving mass riots or protests – which we
would a-priori expect if resources are misappropriated. As we will see, the con-
flict is mainly driven by positive shocks to resource revenues, while negative shocks,
if anything, are associated with slightly less conflict. The null result on protests
and riots suggests that citizens may be poorly informed about revenue allocations
or have a systematically different attitude to misallocation of natural resource rev-
enues as opposed to taxes (see e.g. Gadenne, 2017; Martı´nez, 2017). Yet, as we will
show next, the link between violence and political rents strongly depends on the
underlying institutions, suggesting that revenue sharing may contribute to insta-
bility, only if institutions are weak.
4 Do Elected Local Governments Promote Peace?
We next study the question whether local democratic institutions can reduce
the resource rents induced civil conflict.
4.1 Empirical specification
Our main estimating equation thus becomes
yjst = αje + νAllocjst × Electedjst + γAllocjst + δst + ε jst (4)
In comparison to specification 1, we made two changes. First, our location fixed
effects αje are specific to whether a local authority area has an elected or appointed
local council. This implies that we allow the institution of conducting elections
to have a distinct level effect that is specific to each LGA. While less demanding
specification yield similar results, this implies that we fully abstain – for now – to
study any level effects that having an elected local government may entail and fully
focus on the role of rents. In the empirical specification, our second modification is
17Girard et al. (2018) is related as they study revenue sharing in Kazakhstan focusing on labor
disputes in mining areas.
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that having an elected local government now enters through an added interaction
term Allocjst × Electedjst.
We are particularly interested in the estimates of the coefficients γ relative to
the estimated coefficients ν. Our previous analysis showed that γ > 0, indicating
that positive shocks to the natural resource rents (in places far away from the ac-
tual source of the rents), are positively associated with conflict. In the context of
the theoretical predictions coming out of Besley and Persson (2011b), we would
expect the estimated coefficient ν to be negative, ν < 0, if having an elected local
government implies more cohesive institutions that impose more constraints on the
incumbent to divert rents away from common public goods to payoffs benefiting
their own group. As before, we also show a version of the above specification using
our instrumental variable setup.
4.2 Results
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 3. They suggest that hav-
ing an elected local government significantly weakens the relationship between re-
source rents and conflict. Throughout, the estimated effect of the interaction term
between the natural resource rents and the election status indicator, ν, is negative
and statistically significant, at least at the 5% level. As we will see, the linear regres-
sions are likely to underestimate the moderating effect that elected councils have: the
weakening of the link is mostly driven by positive shocks to resource rents, which
we discuss further below. The weakening of the link is strongly associated with
those types of events and groups involved that are driving this relationship when
local governments are appointed.
An F-test on the joint significance of observing any battle of some sort in column
(2), suggests that the sum of the two coefficients remains weakly positive (0.03) but
is statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.176). This suggests
that, statistically speaking, with elected local governments in place, shocks to rents
cease to be meaningfully correlated with conflict. We will explore the underly-
ing mechanism in detail in the next section. Yet, before we address some natural
concerns that may arise given our exercise
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Addressing plausible concerns There are severalconcerns that may be brought
forward to contest the validity of our results. In particular, a specific worry could
be that elections change the nature of violent contest concentrating violence near
individual elections. We address this in two ways. First of all, we highlight that
the transitions we study are not focusing on any individual election, but rather
mark transitions between consecutive political regimes (periods with elected versus
appointed governments). Nevertheless, conditional on an area using elections to
select local governments, we may be concerned that election related violence distorts
the results. In fact, we document, through an event study in Appendix Figure
A4, that there is indeed an increase in violence in a tight time window around
individual elections. As a simple robustness test, we restrict the estimating sample
to exclude windows around individual elections. If anything, the results, presented
in Table A10, suggests that our results on how elections change the relationship
between resource rents and conflict become even sharper.
Another concern may pertain to the endogeneity of elections to local conditions
or potentially, to the underlying resource rents. This can be tackled in three ways.
First, as we show through a variance decomposition in appendix Table A11, most
of the variation in election status is explained by our state by time fixed effects,
suggesting that this is a decision that is taken at the state level. Hence, holding
elections only in a select set of LGAs within a state – but not others – seems politi-
cally infeasible. Thus, the decision to hold or not hold elections taken by the state
governor is likely exogenous to the conditions of any specific LGA. Second, we do
not estimate – at least in this exercise – the direct level effect of having an elected
local government, but focus on the interaction term. We argue that this interaction
term is exogenous to the conditions in any specific location for two reasons: first,
as already proposed, the decision to hold election is taken at the state level with
limited scope to take the specific conditions in any LGA into account and second,
since oil price movements are erratic and state electoral commissions need at least
three to six months preparation time, it seems implausible that e.g. conflicts are
fought in anticipation of higher resource rents and elections. Lastly, we can directly
test whether the residual variation in having an elected local government left after
controlling for state by time fixed effects meaningfully correlates with an LGA’s
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time-varying or time-invariant characteristics. Neither allocations in the last 3, 6,
or 12 months, nor conflict in the last 3, 6, or 12 months (see Appendix Table A12),
nor an areas climatic conditions, its ethnic make-up or its allocation weights (see
Appendix Table A13) correlate with the residual variation left after controlling for
state by time fixed effects. These three arguments render us confident in saying
that we can interpret the interaction term as being a causal effect.
Finally, another concern may be governors’ direct favoritism to individual LGAs.
Since state governors influence the revenue allocations to their respective states,
they may divert resources to individual LGAs. We can directly control for this
favoritism channel by including state governor specific LGA fixed effects – these
results are presented in Appendix Table A14. Since every state has, on average,
3.4 distinct state governors over our sample period, this amounts to controlling
for, on average, three distinct sets of LGA fixed effects. Despite this specification
being extremely demanding – and likely introducing a lot of irrelevant control vari-
ables, inflating standard errors and resulting in a loss of statistical power – we still
observe very similar results.
Non-linear effects As we suggested before, the estimated effects on the inter-
action term we document in Table 3 are underestimating the true effect, due to
non-linearities in the relationship between resource rents and conflict. We estimate
a non-parametric watercolor regression a` la Hsiang (2013) presented in Figure 4.18
The left panel shows that, with an appointed local government, there is a asso-
ciation with negative shocks to resource rents associated with less conflict, while
positive shocks to the resource rents trigger conflict. The right panel constructs
the figure using the subset of data when local councils are elected. While negative
shocks continue to be weakly associated with less conflict, positive revenue shocks
are not associated with conflict in this subsample. This result suggests that with
elected local governments the tensions arising with positive revenue shocks and
resolve distributional disputes with no conflict. Furthermore, as evidenced by the
green solid OLS regression line, the effects we document by estimating a linear re-
gression are underestimating the effect of having elected local governments, which
18Results from a more conventional estimation method are presented in Appendix Figure A3.
The method is described in more detail in Hsiang (2013).
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mostly operates through its moderating impact during positive resource shocks.
Randomisation inference We also use two forms of randomization inference as
an alternative method for inference. Figure A1 presents the results of a permu-
tation test, whereby the LGA specific sequences of elected vs. appointed regimes
have been shuffled randomly within each LGAs. The kernel density plots out
the distribution of point estimates on the estimated interactions effect between the
(shuffled) election dummy and the gross statutory allocations in our main estimat-
ing specification. The red line corresponds to the point estimate obtained using the
true (non shuffled) election status variable for the interaction term. It is clear that
the interaction for the true election status variable lies on a far tail relative to the
distribution of point estimates for the shuffled variable.
Figure A2 presents results from shuffling the election status variable at the state
level as opposed to the LGA level. This requires us to assign binary values in
case there is variation within state with not all LGA’s within the state holding the
same status. This affects 1,328 state by time observations out of the total 7,104
observations. We assign election status as being 1, in case more than 50% of the
LGAs in a state have an elected LGA at a point in time, while we assign a value of
zero otherwise. Despite this coarser treatment, which introduces some noise and
attenuation bias, we are able to reject the null of no effect at around the 5% level.
Other robustness checks As before, our results also robust to a battery of sim-
pler checks. Appendix Table A15 shows that we obtain very similar results focus-
ing only on the extraordinary allocations, as opposed to the statutory allocations.
Again, we also check our results using alternative conflict data, Appendix Table
A16, transformations in the dependent variable, Appendix Table A17, for differ-
ent temporal resolutions, Appendix Table A18, and alternative functional forms,
Appendix Table A19. As for our baseline results, controlling flexibly for index
weights doesn’t affect the results, shown in Table A20. Throughout the results are
very similar. Next, we validate these results using micro-data.
4.3 Validating results using individual level micro data
To corroborate our findings, we use the Afrobarometer surveys to evaluate
whether individuals perception of violence maps into our findings derived from
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aggregate data. Specifically, we focus on people’s fear of becoming a victim of
political violence, whether individuals actually have been physically attacked, and
if people engage themselves in political violence. We construct a pseudo-panel of
surveyed individuals at the LGA level. This has to be taken with a grain of salt,
as the sampling is not representative at the LGA level and unfortunately, not every
question is asked in each round. Nevertheless, we can use this to study whether
patterns are broadly consistent with the analysis from the conflict data.
To construct a measure of the revenue shock, we compute the total rents accru-
ing to a local government area in the last 6, 12, and 18 months prior to the survey.
The election status is coded based on the survey month. We then estimate the
following specification
yijst = αj + δt + ν× Allocjt × Electedjt + γAllocjt + β× Xijt + εijt (5)
where now in addition the subindex i indicates an individual response and the
allocation variables are constructed as described above. We control for LGA fixed
effects αj and time fixed effects δt, along with the election status and some addi-
tional control variables capturing respondent characteristics in Xijt.
The results are presented in Table 4. A consistent image emerges: locally ac-
cruing resource rents increase individual fear of being a victim of political violence
(columns 1 and 2), increase the actual victimization (columns 3 and 4) and impor-
tantly, indicate that they increase the propensity of individuals to engage in violent
acts (columns 5 and 6). Once an LGA has an elected government, these associations
are significantly weaker.
5 Do Differences in Cohesiveness of Institutions Ex-
plain these Effects?
We next study whether elected local governments – by improving the cohesive-
ness of local governments – weakens the link between resource rents and conflict.
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5.1 Anecdotal evidence
As in other African countries, ethnicity plays an important role in Nigerian
politics. We exploit the ethnic affiliation of state governors, who, when appointing
local governments are known to make those appointments along ethnic lines. There
is ample anecdotal evidence to support this. For example, in Adamawa State,
Governor Murtala Nyako, who was in office between 2007 and 2014, belongs to
the Hausa-Fulani ethnicity, that makes up 31% of the state population. In 2011,
Governor Nyako was accused of favoring his Fulani co-ethnics when appointing
local governments:
He [Nyako] was accused of concentrating a large percentage of his ap-
pointments among his fellow Fulani ethnic stock especially to his kiths
and kin of Mayo Belwa where he hails from. (Leadership, 23/02/2011)
Similarly, young people of the Oron ethnic group complained about being marginal-
ized in Akwa Ibom State, denouncing that there has never been a governor elected
from their own ethnic group
Some Oron youths in Akwa Ibom on Tuesday protested over undue
marginalisation of the Oron nation by the current administration. En-
weme [a commentator] said that since the creation of the state, no Oron
man had ever been an acting governor, not to talk about being a gover-
nor. If you take a look at Oron nation, you will testify that nothing is
happening here. (PM News, 24/12/2014)
In order to construct a measure of cohesion, we build a detailed map of the
population shares of different ethnic groups in LGAs across Nigeria, exploiting the
fact that the DHS survey rounds ask the ethnicity of the respondents. We combine
the data pertaining to all individual DHS surveys. The dominant ethnic group
across LGAs based on population shares is presented visually in Appendix Figure
A5. Figure A6 in the Appendix displays the population shares of the ethnic groups
mentioned above across Adamawa and Akwa Ibom State to illustrate the anecdotes.
We use this to construct a measure of exclusion from political power based on the
ethnicity of the state governor, which we describe next.
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5.2 Measuring non-cohesiveness
As suggested, when local governments are appointed by the state governor,
ethnicity is known to play a central role influencing appointments. To leverage
this, we collected data on the ethnic affiliation of state governors and use the DHS-
derived data giving us the ethnic makeup of the population across LGAs. Under
the assumption that local governments are appointed along ethnic lines, with the
state governor favoring members of his own ethnic group, these appointments are
likely to have heterogeneous effects across the local government areas. In partic-
ular, areas in which the local population is of the same ethnic group as the state
governor, institutions seem relatively more cohesive, compared to areas where the
governor’s co-ethnic population share is small.
Our measure of non-cohesiveness captures the share of the local population
that is of a different ethnic group to the state governor’s. Formally, denote Ekt the
ethnic group of governor in state k at time t. We infer the population share of
the politically excluded ethnic group in LGA j at time t, under the assumption of




where the ethnic group population shares are inferred from combining all exist-
ing DHS data rounds containing that information. Since governors have limited
terms in office, also the governor’s ethnicity is changing over time, which pro-
duces a limited degree of time-variation in our measure of excluded ethnic groups.
Conceptually, we can think of this measure to be the inverse of the cohesiveness
parameter, implying that areas and time periods with larger excluded population
(Excludedjt → 1), are vulnerable to intergroup violence.
To assess whether our measure of exclusion is picking up meaningful signal,
we again turn to the Afrobarometer surveys. For a some survey rounds, the data
provides the ethnic affiliation of respondents, which allows us to measure at the
individual level, whether individuals who have a different ethnic group as the state
governor feel that their own ethnic group is treated unfairly. Appendix Table A21
highlights that this appears to the the case, suggesting that our measure of ethnic
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non-alignment is picking up some grievances. This validation exercise, together
with the anecdotal evidence, suggests that ethnic politics is likely to matter and
that our measure of exclusion, should carry some signal relevant to the theory. We
now bring this measure to bear on the data.
5.3 Empirical specification
We perform two related empirical tests with slightly less demanding empirical
specifications to what we had before. First, rather than ignoring any potential
level effect of having an elected local government on conflict, we study whether the
data suggests such a level effect and whether this is driven by areas that with a
large share of the population is of a different ethnic group compared to the state
governor.
In particular, we estimate
yjst = αj + ηElectedjst × Excludedjt (7)
+ ν× Electedjst + ξ × Excludedjt + δt + ε jst
As suggested, this amounts to a direct test of Corollary 4 in Besley and Persson
(2011b), which proposes that there is a strictly lower likelihood of conflict in places
that have more cohesive institutions. As such, we would expect that any level
effect of having an elected local government on conflict incidence should be driven
by areas manifesting non-cohesiveness, i.e. those that stand out with high values
in Excludedjt. Hence, in the above specification, we expect the estimate on the
interaction coefficient η to be negative, η < 0, implying that in areas where, under
appointed local governments, large shares of the population are excluded from
political power, we anticipate the drop in conflict to be most pronounced.
The second exercise builds on the previous analysis and directly tests whether
the link between resource rents and conflict are driven by places that have non-
cohesive institutions. We use our measure of ethnic exclusion, Excludedjt, to proxy
for the cohesiveness parameter. If having an elected local government makes
institutions more cohesive, our measure relevant to capture the degree of non-
cohesiveness when local governments are appointed, should cease to meaningfully
correlate with resource rent-induced conflict.
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Relative to the main estimation specifications 1 and 4, we add an array of inter-
action terms to estimate how effects are heterogeneous in Excludedjt. Further, due
to lack of statistical power, we need to make the time fixed effects less demand-
ing – rather than including state-by-time fixed effects, we now include only simple
time fixed effects. Here, we expect that resource rent induced conflict is most pro-
nounced in areas with a significant share of the local population excluded from
political power, when local governments are appointed. On the other hand, when
local governments are elected, these areas should be mostly driving the weakening
of the relationship between rents and conflict.
5.4 Results
We present these results in turn. Table 5 presents results from the first analysis,
estimating whether having an elected local government has an effect on levels of
conflict. Panel A presents the estimation of just the plain difference-in-difference
estimation. Throughout the majority of estimated coefficients indicate that having
an elected local government is associated with less conflict. The results indicate
that conflict incidence is around 50% lower during time-periods when local gov-
ernments are elected as opposed to appointed.
Panel B studies a heterogeneous effect version, using the measure of ethnic
exclusion. As expected, the reduction in conflict is mostly driven by places that
would see a significant share of the local population excluded from political power,
when appointments are made based on the ethnicity of the state governor. This
suggests: more cohesive institutions, that elections seem to generate, are associated
with distinctly lower levels of conflict.
We next turn to study how resource rents and our implicit measure of the de-
gree of cohesion interplay. These results are presented in Table 6. In Panel A, we
document that indeed during periods when local governments are appointed, vi-
olence is concentrated in areas with a significant sized population excluded from
political power. In Panel B, we study how this relationship changes when expand-
ing the sample to include periods when local governments are elected, adding the
relevant interaction terms. The results demonstrate that the exclusion of ethnic
groups during periods when local governments are appointed are driving the link
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between exogenous resource revenue shocks and conflict. This result is compelling
as it illustrates the important role local elections may play in forming cohesive gov-
ernments at the local level. It suggests that elected local governments are able to
resolve contest over the allocated resources in a peaceful manner.
We thus find ample evidence that the transition towards having elected local
governments is systematically associated with changing conflict dynamics. The
differential degrees of cohesion that the two distinct institutional setups (appointed
versus elected) generate are at heart to understanding political violence. While the
level effect may be subject to some debate regarding potential excludability, we feel
that we have a convincing case about the exogeneity of the interaction terms we
study. Lastly, we turn again to micro-survey data to substantiate these conclusions.
5.5 Are elected local councils perceived to handle resources dif-
ferently?
The results so far suggest that political violence ceases to be associated with
resource rents during periods when local governments are elected. We provided
evidence suggesting that this is substantively driven by the systematic exclusion of
ethnic groups from political power when local governments are appointed. This
suggests that elected (vis-a-vis appointed) local governments are perceived to be
managing resources very differentially.
We proceed to investigate whether having elected local governments improves
the perceptions of the quality of local governance. This directly maps into the previ-
ous analysis: does the perception of quality, corruption and distrust in government
evolve in fashion correlated with inflow of rents? As before, we use consecutive
rounds of the Afrobarometer survey data measuring how the relationship between
the approval of local governments, the extent of trust and the perception of corrup-
tion change as a function of rents.
The results are presented in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that resource
rents are associated with negative perception of local governments during periods
when local governments are appointed. Having elected local governments signif-
icantly weakens this link. In columns (3) and (4) we perform a similar exercise
studying the perception of corruption: resource rents are associated with increased
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perception of corruption, yet, only when local governments are appointed. Lastly,
in columns (5) and (6) we show that when local governments are appointed, re-
source rents are associated with lower levels of trust. This relationship, again,
significantly weakens when local governments are elected with consistent patterns
throughout.
These results suggest, together with the results presented in Table 6, that elected
local governments are capable of resolving the contest for resource rents in an insti-
tutional form within the local government, and not invoking violence. The change
in the relationship between resource rents and improved approval and trust of
people in the local government suggested that electoral incentives may improve
the quality of resource management and sharing. We highlight with a type of
placebo exercise that these results are specific to the perception of the quality of
local governments and are not confounded by concurrent changes in the percep-
tions of quality of government at other levels of government. Leveraging the fact
that similar measures of the perceptions of the quality governance are collected for
the Federal Parliament or State level institutions, we show in Appendix Table A22
and A23 that there are no similar patterns between resource rents, election status
of local governments and perceptions of federal or state level institutions.
6 Conclusion
Whether scarce resources are allocated in a concordant and peaceful manner
or invoke coercion and violence is one of the important questions guiding a lot
of political economy research. This paper makes headway by contributing to our
understanding of how a particular type of democratic institution – having elected
local governments – can shape and moderate the interactions between groups in
society in a peaceful fashion. This question is particularly relevant to countries
with significant resource wealth, such as Nigeria, as democratic oversight and a
tight institutional framework are proposed to be the central ingredient to ensure
that countries are not being cursed by their resource wealth. While the theoretical
work has suggested the importance of institutions, the empirical research studying
these questions has struggled to provide compelling evidence.
Exploiting within-country variation in democratic institutions at the local level
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in Nigeria, we show that having an elected local government is key to understand-
ing why in some places resource rents are associated with conflict – but not in
others. In doing so, we are able to exploit institutional features that significantly
relaxes identification concerns, while at the same time matching key tenets of the-
oretical models. In particular, we exploit the sharing of natural resource revenues
across tiers of government according to a fixed formula, which ensures that we can
rule out any direct effects that the extraction activity can have on political violence.
Rather, we can exclusively focus on the impact of these rents and document that,
when local governments are appointed, rents are associated with instability and
political violence. We show, consistent with the theory, that the underlying mech-
anism is working through the different degrees of cohesion that the two means
of selection local governments provide. The more disconnected local governments
are from the local population – proxied by the ethnic make-up – the more likely it
is that positive shock to resource rents are associated with political violence. We
confirm these findings in a rich empirical framework, and substantiate and validate
our findings using individual level micro survey data.
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Figure 1: Formula based oil revenue sharing: Formula index weights, oil price movements and time series variation
in statutory local government allocations
Panel A: Index weights Panel B : Overall allocations
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Notes: Panel A: Total Index Weight for each local government area based on the horizontal revenue sharing formula of 2006. Panel B: Monthly variation in overall revenue
allocations made to local governments (right scale), and monthly prices of Brent Crude oil (left scale).
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Figure 2: Spatial and temporal variation in the elected versus appointed local government area status
Panel A: Spatial variation Panel B: Temporal variation
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Notes: Panel A: Share of months with an elected local government for each local government area in the period 1999 to 2014. Panel B: Monthly time series variation in the
share of local government areas with an elected government council over time.
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Figure 3: Conflict intensity across Nigeria








Notes: The map shows the distribution of conflict events across local government areas in the period 1999 to 2014.
Sources: conflict data is from ACLED and administrative boundaries are from Global Administrative Areas (GADM;
https://gadm.org/).
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Figure 4: Positive and Negative Resource Shocks Under Elected and Appointed Regime
(a): Appointed Local Council (b): Elected Local Council
Notes: The figure presents results from bootstrapped lowess regressions on the residuals of the dependent variable, after having demeaned the data by LGA and state-by-time
fixed effects. The method first computes lowess regressions from 1000 bootstrapped samples of the demeaned data. It then calculates density estimates of the predictions
from the lowess regressions for several hundred cuts along the y-axis and distributes a specified color proportional to that density estimate. The resulting figure displays the
uncertainty in the regressions visually. The median value of the bootstrapped lowess predictions is indicated as a solid white line, while OLS regressions are indicated as a
green line. Figure (a) presents the results for periods with appointed local councils, while Figure (b) displays the results for periods with elected local councils.
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Table 1: Revenue Allocation Formula
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Equality 0.138 0
Population 0.104 0.058
Internal Revenue Generation effort 0.009 0.004
Landmass 0.017 0.021
Terrain 0.017 0
Health - Hospital Beds 0.01 0.005
Education - Primary enrollment 0.014 0.008
Rain - Water supply spread 0.005 0.006
Rain - Rainfall share 0.005 0
Total index 0.345 0.068
N 774
Notes: Mean and Standard deviation of the different sub-indices that feed into the
overall index weight used to allocate revenues to local government areas (revenue al-
location formula of 2006). Source: Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC).
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Table 2: The effect of resource rents on political violence when local councils are appointed
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.237*** 0.116** 0.153*** 0.017 0.118** 0.199*** 0.065** -0.010 0.099** 0.136**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.051) (0.035) (0.046) (0.062) (0.027) (0.007) (0.042) (0.055)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: IV
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.341*** 0.126** 0.199*** 0.054 0.153*** 0.252*** 0.075** -0.005 0.109** 0.160**
(0.107) (0.057) (0.059) (0.040) (0.058) (0.086) (0.029) (0.011) (0.049) (0.068)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the
use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving
civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups.
Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged
in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of
actors involved. The main explanatory variable is the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index weight
interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Resource rents and conflict – moderating effect of having an elected local government
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.213*** 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.009 0.118*** 0.187*** 0.054** -0.011 0.097** 0.140***
(0.073) (0.043) (0.049) (0.030) (0.042) (0.060) (0.024) (0.008) (0.037) (0.051)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.131* -0.083** -0.084* -0.006 -0.086** -0.128** -0.045** 0.026*** -0.082** -0.111**
(0.068) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040) (0.043) (0.057) (0.020) (0.009) (0.039) (0.049)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: IV
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.310*** 0.127** 0.178*** 0.043 0.164*** 0.242*** 0.055** -0.010 0.114** 0.161***
(0.099) (0.052) (0.056) (0.035) (0.055) (0.082) (0.026) (0.015) (0.045) (0.062)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.224** -0.114** -0.107** -0.038 -0.153*** -0.183** -0.048* 0.023 -0.112** -0.117**
(0.088) (0.049) (0.053) (0.039) (0.053) (0.077) (0.025) (0.015) (0.044) (0.058)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force
by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by
an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups
involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political
organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main explanatory variable is the monthly revenue
allocation to a local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B)
uses the index weight interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Resource rents, elected (vs appointed) local governments and individual
level victimization and participation in conflict
Fear of political violence Physically attacked Engage in violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.330 0.342* 0.090 0.105* 0.046 0.067*
(0.206) (0.200) (0.055) (0.057) (0.029) (0.034)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.138 -0.135 -0.087** -0.099** -0.031 -0.052*
(0.117) (0.118) (0.044) (0.046) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Panel B:
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.135* 0.141* 0.049* 0.059** 0.019 0.028*
(0.082) (0.080) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.064 -0.063 -0.046** -0.052** -0.013 -0.022*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Panel C:
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.102* 0.105** 0.036** 0.042** 0.013 0.019*
(0.054) (0.052) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.049 -0.048 -0.032** -0.036*** -0.009 -0.015*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variables in column (1)–(2) indicates
how much a respondent personally fears to become a victim of political intimidation or violence; columns (3)–(4) indicates how often the respondent
or someone in the respondent’s family has been physically attacked in the past year; columns (5)–(6) indicates whether how often respondent has used
force or violence for a political cause. Panel (A) uses the sum of monthly revenue allocations in the last 6 months, Panel (B) in the last 12 months, and
Panel (C) in the last 18 months. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent
controls include the respondents age, educational attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban
area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and Conflict: Estimation of effect on conflict levels
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Level effect
Elected -0.007** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.001 -0.004** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0251 .0093 .0116 .00566 .0087 .0137 .00519 .000936 .00509 .00862
Panel B: Ethnic alignment heterogenous effect
Elected -0.007** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.005** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Elected × Non-aligned ethnic group -0.015*** -0.005* -0.011*** -0.003** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.004** 0.002** -0.006** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Non-aligned ethnic group 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0257 .00959 .0121 .00551 .00864 .0141 .00542 .00103 .00507 .00901
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force
by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by
an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups
involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political
organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main explanatory variable Elected indicates whether
a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different ethnic group than the state governor.
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and Conflict: Triple Difference-in-Differences with Allocated
Rents
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Appointed local governments
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.336*** 0.150*** 0.222*** 0.010 0.156*** 0.310*** 0.077*** -0.002 0.140*** 0.214***
(0.093) (0.054) (0.062) (0.036) (0.052) (0.081) (0.028) (0.007) (0.046) (0.066)
Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.138*** 0.059** 0.118*** -0.003 0.083*** 0.128*** 0.033*** -0.006 0.071*** 0.104***
(0.041) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.025) (0.035) (0.012) (0.004) (0.023) (0.028)
Observations 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0303 .0117 .016 .00467 .0112 .02 .00524 .0012 .00795 .0133
Panel B: including interaction terms
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.263*** 0.108*** 0.168*** 0.029 0.122*** 0.213*** 0.044* 0.007 0.095*** 0.145***
(0.068) (0.035) (0.040) (0.024) (0.033) (0.053) (0.024) (0.005) (0.027) (0.040)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.076** -0.058*** -0.064*** 0.021 -0.044** -0.119*** 0.005 0.003 -0.059*** -0.088***
(0.032) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.022)
Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.149*** 0.064** 0.126*** -0.003 0.088*** 0.139*** 0.036*** -0.006 0.076*** 0.112***
(0.041) (0.025) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.036) (0.012) (0.004) (0.024) (0.029)
Elected × Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Stat. Alloc. -0.174*** -0.060** -0.122*** -0.035 -0.078*** -0.118*** -0.050*** 0.005 -0.062*** -0.092***
(0.047) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.028) (0.036) (0.017) (0.006) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0243 .00934 .0115 .00491 .00836 .0135 .00515 .00106 .00485 .00857
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects. Panel A is estimated off the sample with appointed local governments and includes LGA fixed effects, while Panel B includes the periods with elected local governments
and a separate set of LGA fixed effects for periods in which governments are elected. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of
events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4)
protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal
militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic
interaction of actors involved. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different
ethnic group than the state governor. LGC Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Individual Level Perception of Local Governance
Approval of LGC Council LGC Councillors corrupt Trust in LGC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.338*** -0.337*** 0.397*** 0.384** -0.257** -0.238*
(0.122) (0.124) (0.150) (0.151) (0.125) (0.143)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.233** 0.208** -0.203* -0.188* 0.197** 0.170*
(0.102) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) (0.085) (0.088)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.165*** -0.165*** 0.174*** 0.168** -0.108* -0.098
(0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.056) (0.063)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.114** 0.103** -0.094** -0.088* 0.084** 0.071*
(0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.110*** -0.110*** 0.120*** 0.117*** -0.075** -0.066
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.076** 0.068** -0.065** -0.061** 0.057** 0.047*
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates
how much a respondent approves of the performance of the local government councillor (4-point Likert scale); in columns (3)–(4) it captures how many of
the local councillors a respondent thinks are involved in corruption; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trusts the local government council
(4-point Likert scale). Panel (A) uses the sum of monthly revenue allocations in the last 6 months, Panel (B) in the last 12 months, and Panel (C) in the
last 18 months. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include
the respondents age, educational attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Section A provides a more detailed discussion of the institutional context in
Nigeria. Section B provides additional figures and tables.
A Extended Discussion of Institutional Background
In this section, we describe the institutional context in further detail. First, we
explain what the main characteristics of Nigerian fiscal federalism are and how
local and state governments are mainly funded by oil revenues. Second, we de-
scribe the role of local government council elections and how we use Nigerian
news media to collect data on the conduct of local elections and the appointment
of caretaker committees by state governors. Third, we describe the geo-referenced
data employed to measure violent events and how different local political regimes
may be associated with conflict.
A.1 Fiscal federalism, oil revenues and local government finance
Nigeria exhibits a system of fiscal federalism with rules defined in the Nigerian
Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The largest part of tax revenues
are paid into a centrally managed Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation,
the Federation Account. This federation account is mostly alimented from tax
revenue on oil and value-added tax (VAT). Oil tax revenues comprise a major part
of overall tax revenues, and are fundamental for public finances at all government
levels; e.g. in the year 2013, they amounted to 75% of budgetary revenues (World
Bank, 2013). The centrally collected tax revenues are then allocated to the 3 tiers of
government, the federal government, the states and the local government councils
according to a specific allocation formula by the Federation Account Allocation
Committee (FAAC) under the auspices of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and
1
Fiscal Commission according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(1999).1
Under the 1999 constitution, at least 13% percent of oil revenues must directly
flow back to the oil-producing states to account for their status as the source of
revenues. This rule is known as the derivation principle (Federal Republic of Nige-
ria, 1999).2 Subsequently, the collected tax revenues are divided by a vertical and
horizontal allocation formula. The vertical allocation formula states that 52.68 per-
cent of revenue allocations are disbursed to the federal government, 26.72 percent
to the state governments and the FCT (Abuja), and 20.60 percent to the local gov-
ernments. The share of revenues that accrues to the state and local government
councils, is then further divided according to a horizontal allocation formula that
makes allowance for geographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respec-
tive administrative unit. These geographic and socio-economic indicators of the
formula are (i) equality 40%; (ii) population 30%; (iii) internal revenue generation
Effort 10%; (iv) landmass and terrain 10%; (v) education 4%; (vi) health 3% (pri-
mary school enrolment); (vii) water supply 3% (rainfall).3 Panel (A) in Figure 1
presents a map representing the revenue allocation index weight for each of the
774 local government areas. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the various
demographic and socio-economic characteristics comprising the allocation index
weights calculated for each local government by the FAAC. Population and land-
mass are by far the most important factors when it comes to explaining the cross
1The Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission is comprised of a chairman and
one member from each state and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Federation Account
Allocation Committee is constituted of the Federal Minister of Finance, representatives of each state
(usually the states’ commissioners of Finance and their accountants-general), and representatives
from fiscal and monetary related federal agencies such as the Central Bank, and the Customs and
Federal Inland Revenue Services (Maystadt and Salihu, 2015).
2The states benefiting from the derivation principle are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River,
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Anambra recently also became an oil producing state, yet they
haven’t benefited from the derivation principle during our study period.
3The landmass and terrain factor is further equally divided into one constant part for all local
government areas according to terrain conditions in the state (50% of 10%), and a second part
measuring the size of the landmass of each local government area (50% of 10%). The internal
revenue generation effort is further divided into one part applying to each local government council
in each state equally (75% of 10%), and one part depending on the individual revenue effort of each
local government council (25% of 10%). The water supply factor is further equally divided into
an equality part applying to all local government councils equally in each state (50% of 3%), and
territorial spread of rainfall depending on each local government area’s rainfall (50% of 3%).
2
sectional variation in the overall index. On the other hand, factors such as Equality,
Terrain and Rainfall share do not vary across the country.
Data on monthly allocations and the index weights are published by the FAAC
of the Federal Ministry of Finance. We assemble the monthly allocation data to a
balanced panel including all 774 local government areas for the period June 1999
to July 2014.4 The information on the monthly allocations is communicated by the
Accountant-General of the Federation in Abuja each month.
Oil revenues that aliment the Federation Account depend both on the price
of crude oil and the magnitude of oil production. We hence obtain data on the
crude oil price from Thomson Reuters5 and monthly oil product data from Nige-
rian National Petroleum Corporation. The relevant variable to drive the variation
behind changes in monthly allocations to local government areas appears to be the
oil price, and not the production quantity. Table A2 in the appendix highlights
that the amount of variation in the monthly levels of oil production is significantly
smaller compared to the variation in monthly oil prices. Monthly Nigerian crude
oil production varies around a mean of 2.32 million barrels with a standard devia-
tion of 0.17 million barrels, while monthly oil prices vary around a mean monthly
price of USD 64.21 with a standard deviation of USD 34.97, suggesting that the
bulk of the variation in allocations is due to price variation. This is relevant to the
extent that prevailing world oil prices are unaffected by Nigerian oil production.
In our empirical analysis, we investigate whether oil producing states are af-
fected differently by violence compared to non-oil states. We hence collect data on
the location of oil and gas fields from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (NNPC) across Nigeria. We construct a dummy that is equal to 1 in case a
local government area is intersecting an oil field. This measure includes not only
producing oil fields, but also fields that are under exploration. In total 63 local
government areas do have an oil or gas field. Additionally, we also create an indi-
cator variable to mark states as oil producing. As discussed in the paper, Appendix
Table A9 demonstrates that violence in oil-producing areas – as in the rest of the
country – appears to be driven by the statutory allocations to the local government
4The data was available on www.faac.gov.ng in April 2015. The website is currently not online
(August 2017).
5We use the Brent Crude Oil Price extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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councils.
Statutory and extraordinary allocations Federal allocations of oil revenues can
be roughly divided into two categories of disbursements. Statutory allocations are
calculated based on a benchmark price of oil determined at the beginning of each
year and are regularly disbursed each month. Extraordinary allocations are disbursed
irregularly and are based on idiosyncratic political decisions. Such augmented
allocations originate from the Excess Crude Account (ECA). The ECA was established
2004 in order to collect resource revenues that accrue due to the difference between
the yearly benchmark oil price and the actual market price. Its objective was to
account for the volatility in crude oil prices to protect planned budgets (Central
Bank of Nigeria, 2012). Essentially, it was set up as a “rainy day fund”.6
The ECA was surrounded by controversies throughout its existence (Central
Bank of Nigeria, 2012). It was subject to the whims of political leaders, which
raised serious concerns about transparency and accountability. It was meant to de-
link government expenditure from oil revenues in order to insulate the Nigerian
economy from external shocks. Due to surging oil prices, the funds collected in the
ECA increased almost fourfold from $ 5.1 billion to over $ 20 billion by Novem-
ber 2008. Due to budget deficits at all government level as a consequence of the
financial crisis and falling oil prices, the ECA decreased to less than $ 4 billion in
2010. The augmentation payments to the three tiers of government from the ECA
are rather unexpected as they are due to unexpected changes in oil prices.
A large part of accumulated funds was depleted in the year 2009, when in
February the state governors asked for the sharing of $ 4 billion from the account.
The newspaper Leadership reported that the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties
(CNPP) to make public the actual use of $ 130 billion accruing to the ECA since
2000.
In the year 2009, there was a $ 2 billion stimulus package paid out to the three
tiers of government. The federal government received $842, the 36 states received $
799.648 million while the 774 local government councils got the balance of $ 358.4
6In 2010, Nigeria’s National Economic Council approved the creation of a national sovereign
wealth fund to replace the Excess Crude Account. The establishment of the Nigeria Sovereign
Investment Authority was signed into law on 25 May, 2011 (Nigeria Sovereign Investment Autor-
ity, 2015). The wealth fund operates three separate funds, the Stabilisation Fund (SF), the Future
Generations Fund (FGF), and the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund (NIF).
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million. The state with the largest amount paid out was Rivers with $ 108.7 mil-
lion, while the state with the smallest amount received was Ebonyi with $ 10.4
million (Daily Trust, 19 October 2009). Vanguard (2 April, 2009) reports that Presi-
dent Yar Adua succumbed to the pressure of state governors to deplete the ECA.
So it became a additional source of extra money for the three tiers of government.
Local government responsibilities According to the constitution (Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria, 1999), economic planning and development is in joint responsibility
of state and local government councils. The constitution instructs local govern-
ments to form an economic planning board. While the local governments appear
to be a tier of government that are an executing body for the state governments,
they have indeed substantial autonomy. Most important, they are responsible to
provide primary education and primary health care services.7 Local governments
should build and maintain the physical infrastructure of primary health centres,
payment of all staff salaries and ensuring the centres sufficient stock of medicines
and other resources. With regard to education, local governments bear the respon-
sibility to execute government education policies and to run primary schools on
a daily basis (for further details see Albin-Lackey, 2007). Further responsibilities
include such diverse tasks as the provision of adult and vocational education, and
the development of agriculture and natural resources (other than the exploitation).8
Overall, the local governments play a prominent role in providing public goods that
are important in the citizens everyday life. The absence of a functioning local gov-
ernment may thus create grievances among the local population and lower its trust
in institutions.
7According to Khemani (2006), the real responsibility of providing education and health care
services is indeed delegated to local governments, although the constitution puts the task in the joint
responsibility of state and local governments. An informative account of how local government are
de-facto responsible for providing education and health care services is given in (Albin-Lackey,
2007), in 5 case studies of local governments (Etche, Khana, Tai, Akuku/Toru, and Obio/Akpor). A
World Bank report describes in an insightful way how local governments can outperform other local
government areas if the local government council is active and willing to implement progressive
policies (see World Bank, 2002, p. 46).
8The local government council further makes recommendations to the State commission on
economic planning on diverse issues such as the construction and maintenance of roads, streets,
street lightings, drains, the provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse
disposal, the control and regulation of shops, kiosks, restaurants, bakeries, and other places for the
sale of food, and the licensing, regulation, and control of the sale of liquor (Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999).
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Local government finance management With the transition to democratic rule in
1999, the Nigerian fiscal system was decentralized rapidly. According to a World
Bank report, the share of sub-national budget spending in the consolidated budget
increased from 23% in 1999 to 46% in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). The sub-national
budget expenditure already was almost four times higher in 2005 than in 1999 in
real terms, while the expenditure at the local level in fact grew even faster than
at the state level, so that sub-national budget systems have become more decen-
tralized. This followed a stricter implementation of federal allocations than in the
1990s.
The bulk of gross revenues at local level originate from disbursements out of the
federation account. Local governments can raise internally generated revenues as
well. Their ability and the extent to which they do, however, is very limited. Over-
all they raised less than 5% of gross revenues through internally generated means
in the period 2001–2005 (Eboh et al., 2006). This is not surprising as tax powers
available to local governments are limited to minor subjects, such as property tax
and market and trading licences.9 As local governments hence heavily depend on
the allocations of resource revenues from the Federation Account, which heavily
fluctuate with global oil prices, their fiscal situation is highly volatile and unsus-
tainable (World Bank, 2013).
Various reports and newspaper articles describe the mismanagement of public
finances at the local level. Human Rights Watch (HRM, 2007) conducted a detailed
analysis of local government finances in a number of local government areas in
Rivers State, which apparently is a difficult task as local government councils treat
the budgets and financial reports as closely guarded secrets. HRM specifically in-
vestigated how local finances are managed, focusing on expenditures for education
and health care (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
By Rivers State law, the legislative body in each local government is to approve
or vote down annual budgets presented by the chairperson of the LGC. Legisla-
tive councils are also entitled to review the end-of-year expenditure reports that
are submitted by the chair. This check on the chairperson’s handling of local bud-
gets – although theoretically important – ended up being an opportunity for local
councils members to ask for bribes, as a device for self-enrichment, in return for
9A full list of tax powers is provided in Ekpo and Englama (2008).
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passing the budget. Many local councillors see the budget process as the best op-
portunity to claim their share of the allocated revenues. Once the councillors got
their requested share of the pie, the chairmen are left free and unconstrained to
spend the remaining allocations according to their preferences and not accounted
in the budget process (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
Substantial revenues are declared in the local budget process for projects that
are never properly implemented or are even non-existent. One local government
chairman in Rivers State spent huge sums on e.g. a “demonstration fish pond”
that was never operational and payment of more than 100 “functional commit-
tee/protocol officers” whose responsibilities were entirely unclear (Albin-Lackey,
2007). According to the newspaper Daily Champion, in Oshimili local government
area, N 2 million were apparently spent on erosion control, yet there was no visi-
ble sign of such a project. Another example of very poor budget implementation
is Warri South local government, where millions of Naira have been allocated to
landscaping the chairman’s house, construction/renovation of market stalls, the
purchase of generator transformers, the provision of a solar water scheme, the con-
struction of drains/culverts, the maintenance of parks and gardens, the construc-
tion of motor parks in selected towns, and the construction of television viewing
centres. Yet, none of these projects were actually implemented.10 These examples
of the local public finance management provide both an insight into the variety of
projects that are budgeted and the poor implementation in many cases. Although
these are just examples, they represent larger inefficiencies of public finance man-
agement at the local level, as described in detail in (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
The failure to pay salaries, is another example of the poor public finance man-
agement at the local level (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 13). It is reported that in LGCs
in Rivers State, salaries for public sector workers are routinely withheld while the
funds that were set aside to pay them disappear. In other local governments, it is
alleged that non-existent workers are on the payroll of local governments, which is
another way for local politicians to siphon away public funds (Albin-Lackey, 2007,
p. 34).
While citizens at the local level observe that local government council mem-
10These accounts of poor public finance management can be in found in the newspaper The Daily
Champion, 22 June, 2007.
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bers enrich themselves, the provision of health care and education is miserable.
According to a civil society organization in Port Harcourt11, the local government
chairs have no objectives other than getting paid to do nothing. Except for pay-
ing salaries, the local governments have ceased to perform any duties assigned to
them. Some local government chairmen apparently do not even reside in their local
governments, but only come back to pay out salaries and to distribute the remain-
der of the monthly allocations as patronage. While there are few positive accounts
of local finance management, the overall assessment is usually rather devastating.
An official of the Federal Economic and Financial Crimes Commission stated: “To
say that [local government] everywhere is a disaster is not a fair assessment, but
it is not far from the truth.” (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p.25). A positive example in the
use of increased local public finances is Tai LGC. According to HRM, Tai LGC used
the allocated revenues to implement numerous projects such as renovating schools,
building new classroom blocks, and constructed 7 new health care centres. The Tai
LGC compiled a list of all projects undertaken and also made it public. Many of
the projects were undertaken at the request of the communities within the local
government (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p.27).
It becomes clear that local governments public finance management is poor, yet
differs in capacity across LGAs. Because of the high volatility in oil prices, the flow
of allocations into local accounts is both hard to predict and opens the floodgates
to misappropriate public funds. This brings us back to the main variation we
use in our empirical framework. As mentioned above and shown in Table A1,
the within-LGA variation in allocations is considerable and driven by global oil
prices (see Table A2). This high volatility makes the processes in public finance
management, such as paying public servants’ salaries or providing public goods,
difficult and non-transparent and calls for strong political factions to appropriate
its share, using force if necessary.
A.2 Violent contest for institutionalized rents
The poor local governance and mismanagement or outright embezzlement of
public funds possibly creates grievances within the local population. It may even
lead political groups to use force in order to contest for their share of the oil revenue
11Port Harcourt is the capital and largest city in Rivers State.
8
pie. The contest for these institutionalized rents that flow through local and state
governments is a possible cause of low-intensity conflict throughout Nigeria as all
governments are benefiting from the revenue allocations.
Data on civil conflict over the entire sample period is drawn from the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).12 The ACLED project provides
details on geographic locations of conflict events in terms of latitude and longitude,
dates, and additional information on the actors involved. In particular, it codes the
actions of rebels, governments, and militias, allowing an analysis of the local level
factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict. The variation in conflict
events across Nigeria that we use in our empirical analysis is displayed in Figure 3,
depicting the number of violent events for each of the 774 local government areas
over the period 1999 to 2014.
Nigeria is in a state of low-intensity conflict. Generally small scale violent events
cause numerous casualties each year. We propose that these kinds conflicts are –
to a large extent – contests between political factions for the control over local gov-
ernments. The control of local government councils brings with it the perks of
the allocations from the Federation Account. While in some local government ar-
eas, the political contest for the institutionalized resource rents may work through
peaceful means, in other cases the contest is likely to be fought with physical in-
timidation and force. In the following, we provide anecdotal evidence for these
low-intensity conflicts across Nigeria.
One case of such low-intensity conflict is reported in the newspaper This Day
about violent incidences in Afikpo and Ivo local governments, Ebonyi State. Several
cases of gross misconduct and malpractice of local government officers triggered
off protest, lead to the destruction of property and the murder of a prominent busi-
nessman, the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in charge of Ivo local government, and
the vice principal of a secondary school. It finally developed into a “full-blown”
conflict. The newspaper article also suggests that governing politicians should stop
to use state resources and machinery to hound and intimidate perceived opponents
(This Day, 18 September, 2001). The communal conflicts in Ebonyi state continued,
as reported by the newspaper Vanguard in October 2008. The newspaper described
12The ACLED conflict events data is available at https://www.acleddata.com/. Raleigh and
Dowd (2015) provide a detailed description of variables and coding methodology.
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how the upsurge in violence between communities in the state can be traced to the
monthly allocations from the Federation Account (Vanguard, 28 October, 2008).
Further evidence of violence related to public misuse of funds is reported by
Human Rights Watch (2007) for Khana and Etche local governments, Rivers State.
In Khana, political opponents tried to remove the chairman from office, yet failed,
which again created an increased level of violence and insecurity. In 2006, op-
position forces burnt down a part of the new local government secretariat in a
night-time attack. The very public revolt has helped to cast light on the rampant
government malfeasance and its impact on the health and education sectors. The
chairman was accused of having channelled large sums of money into dubious or
non-existent projects, and that he also passed some of that money on to thugs to
enforce his will in Khana (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
In Etche local government, chairman Nwuzi was elected into office in 2004. By
the end of 2005, local government councillors charged him of misappropriating a
large portion of what they called “huge monthly allocations to the council”. Their
grievances were also triggered by the alleged failure to pay salaries and other al-
lowances that were due to them. Councillors also accused the chairman of using
“thugs equipped with dangerous weapons” to intimidate them into abandoning
their request to get their share of the allocations paid into to local governments
account in the first 18 months of the chairman’s office (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 64).
According to the report, local councillors were even forced by thugs, also known
as the chairman’s “boys”, to sign loyalty oaths to stop asking for their share of
the accounts. Apparently, the local government chairman Nwuzi had to pay large
amounts of the monthly allocations to his political “godfather”, the Rivers State
Commissioner for Sport who helped him to win office. When the chairman had
to flee after a heated confrontation with local residents over the replacement of an
electrical transformer, he apparently shot wildly into the crowd killing one person
(Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 65).
Even the Boko Haram conflict is reported to be related to local government mis-
management by local observers. In an opinion article in the Daily Trust, Kaka Bolori
writes how the Boko Haram violence is related to government mismanagement:
If one is to summarize the entire Boko Haram conflict, I can simply say
it is an organized crime between few aggrieved original Boko Haram
10
members and those who are in the helm of affairs of government. In
other words, the conflict is all about fraud, theft and embezzlement
occurring within or against the state, local governments’ finances and
people of Borno. (Daily Trust, 15 December, 2015)
Overall, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of violence related to the contest
over resource rents disbursed to local governments as monthly allocations from the
Federation Account. Violence is reported to be associated with the misconduct of
local government chairmen and their failure to provide education and health ser-
vices, mismanagement of local public finances such as omission of paying salaries,
or the embezzlement of public funds. The acts of fraud provokes violent reactions
by opposing political groups who want to claim their share of the pie.
A.3 The role of local government elections
Civil violence and riots are often related to elections, be they general elections or
local government elections. Figure A4 in the appendix depicts a surge in violence
around local government council elections. The role of local elections with regard
to civil violence is thus a priori unclear. Local elections may be a trigger event for
violence, when opposition parties perceive that elections are not held in a free and
fair manner and demand a level playing field. The event of a local election may in
this case be an opportunity for political factions to show their strength and support
by the people, using violent means if necessary.13 In this paper we mainly focus
on the systematic violence that is not specifically related to elections, but happens
throughout the term periods of local politicians.
The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 stipulates that local government councils
must be elected by the people (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Even though
the federal structure of governance includes three tiers of government, the con-
stitution gives the state governments considerable influence over the organization
and regulation of local government councils and holding local elections. The main
13One of the worst violent outbreaks around a local government council election, reported
around the World, was the clash between members of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and mem-
bers of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) over a local election result in Jos city, Plateau state.
761 people were killed, schools, churches and mosques burnt to the grounds in the post-election
violence, as the PDP claimed their victory. The opposition probably realised that a defeat would cut
them off from the allocations for years to come. For further details, see BBC News, 29 November
2008.
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problem with the constitutional provision guaranteeing local elections is that it
treats the local governments not rigorously as an independent tier of government.
In contrast to the Independent National Electoral Commission that supervises
the general elections, State Independent Electoral Commissions are appointed by
the state government. It is the body to organise, undertake, and supervise local
government elections. It consists of a chairman and no less than five but not more
than seven other members (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Furthermore, the
state governor has to provide the financing for the conduct of local council elections
so that local officials hinge on the intentions and decisions of the governor.
The first post-autocratic local government councils elections were held in Novem-
ber/December 1998 as a preparation of the democratic presidential elections in
February 1999, which marked the transition from military to civilian rule. After
the first term of the initially elected local councils ended in May 2002, confusion
emerged as the national voter register was not updated to possibly hold another
local election. In June 2002, most state governors appointed so-called ‘caretaker’ or
‘transition committees’ to (temporarily) run the local governments. Ever since that
decisive moment in 2002 when caretaker committees were appointed, the election
of local governments became a political controversy.14 In the following years, the
local government councils were in many cases not elected bodies of government
anymore, but appointed bodies in many instances. This created de-facto variation
in local political institutions across Nigeria. While some states, like Cross River
or Enugu, local government council elections have been held (almost) consistently
throughout the period from 2004 to 2014, and hence were more democratic in that
sense, other states like Ondo or Yobe state had appointed caretaker committees for
the larger part of that same period (see Figure 2).
We draw data on the conduct of local government council elections or appoint-
ment of caretaker committees from a media content analysis using Nigerian News-
papers, presented in more detail in Kyburz (2017). Since official information on
local councils is not available, we have to resort on media outlets, to gather a con-
sistent picture about local governance in the 774 local government areas. The news-
14See Kyburz (2017) for a more detailed description of the controversy surrounding local gov-
ernment council elections and the appointment of caretaker committees.
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paper articles are collected in the FACTIVA media data base.15 From local Nigerian
newspaper articles, we extract information on local government council elections.16
By using a series of keywords, it is possible to determine for each of the 774 local
government areas the date when local elections were held, the tenure of elected
councils, and the periods when caretaker committees were appointed.
We use the de-facto variation in the ‘state of democracy’ at the local level to
analyze whether local elections have a pacifying effect on civil violence. We cre-
ate a dummy variable that measures for each month the election status of a local
government, hence whether a local council is elected by the people (Elected = 1) or
appointed as caretaker committee by the state governor (Elected = 0).
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B Additional Tables and Figures
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Notes: Permutation test on the interaction effect between gross statutory allocations and the elected
status dummy. 100 permutations were constructed by randomly reordering spells of appointed vs
elected governments at the LGA level. Each model is estimated including state by time and LGA
fixed effects. The vertical line indicates the estimate that is obtained with the true data. It is clear
that we can safely reject the null hypothesis with a p-value of less than 0.001.
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Notes: Permutation test after permuting the election status dummy across the 37 states, thus ignor-
ing part of the local variation. 100 permutations were constructed by randomly reordering spells
of appointed vs elected governments at the state level. Each model is estimated including time and
LGA fixed effects. The vertical line indicates the estimate that is obtained with the true data. We
can reject the null hypothesis of no effect with a p-value of 0.05.
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Figure A3: Conventional test for non-linearities
(a): Appointed Local Council (b): Elected Local Council
Notes: The figures are constructed by demeaning the conflict outcome as well as the Gross Statutory Allocations by the location and time fixed effects, sub-setting the sample
into two parts: one with elected and one with appointed local governments. The residuals of the allocations are subdivided into quintiles and we then estimate a simple
specification using the quintiles as categorical right hand side measures. The resulting point estimates per quintile are plotted out. The figure displays the effect of LGC
Gross Statutory Allocations per month on civil conflict by quintile of the shock without (left) and with (right) elected LGC. 90% confidence intervals obtained from clustering
standard errors two way by time and state are indicated.
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Figure A4: Conflict around election months
Notes: The figure presents estimated coefficients from a regression with the left hand side being a dummy
variable indicating whether there was any conflict event in an LGA and month. The regression removes LGA
fixed effects and time fixed effects prior and then regresses the residualized dependent variable on a set of
dummies capturing the time to the election date. Standard errors are clustered at the LGA level and 10%
confidence bands are indicated.
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Figure A5: Distribution of Ethnic Groups across Nigeria




Notes: The map shows the distribution of ethnic groups across Nigeria. For each local government area the
largest ethnic group is displayed in a different colour. The largest groups are the Yoruba in light blue (South-
West), the Hausa-Fulani in pink (North), and the Igbo/Ibo in yellow (South-East) Sources: own calculations
based on ethnic information in the Demographic Health Surveys. Administrative boundaries are from Global
Administrative Areas (GADM; https://gadm.org/)
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Figure A6: Population Shares of various ethnic groups in Akwa Ibom and Taraba states
Panel A: Akwa Ibom State
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Notes: Panel A presents population shares for the (a) Ibibio and (b) Oron ethnic groups across local government areas
in Akwa Ibom State. Panel B presents population shares for the (a) Hausa-Fulani and (b) Mumuye ethnic groups across
local government areas in Taraba State. Sources: Population shares of ethnic groups across local government areas are
calculated based on respondents’ information on ethnicity and language in 5 Demographic Health Surveys (1990, 2003,
2008, 2010, 2013). Administrative boundaries are from Global Administrative Areas (GADM; https://gadm.org/).
20
Table A1: Within- and between LGA variation in different types of FAAC
Allocations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Total Allocations overall 0.305 0.243 N = 140868
between 0.074 n = 774
within 0.231 T = 182
Statutory Allocations overall 0.206 0.122 N = 140868
between 0.040 n = 774
within 0.115 T = 182
Extraordinary Allocations overall 0.056 0.131 N = 140868
between 0.011 n = 774
within 0.131 T = 182
Notes: The table presents a decomposition of the variation in the Federation Account
Allocation Committee (FAAC) allocations within- and between LGA’s. Statutory Allo-
cations are calculated based on a benchmark oil price defined at the beginning of each
year. Extraordinary Allocations are additional revenue transfers from the Excess Crude
Account (ECA) based on the same allocation formula defined by the FAAC. These allo-
cations are subject to idiosyncratic political decisions. Source: information on monthly
allocations is published by the FAAC.
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Table A2: Decomposition of Allocations by Type and Oil Price used
Overall Allocations Statutory allocations Extra allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Brent Crude Oil Price
Total index × brent 18.496*** 18.496*** 18.496*** 8.710*** 8.710*** 8.710*** 5.068*** 5.068*** 5.068***
(1.406) (1.409) (1.438) (0.392) (0.393) (0.403) (1.157) (1.157) (1.196)
LGC FE X X X X X X
Time FE X X X
R2 .693 .713 .972 .828 .833 .987 .203 .204 .967
Observations 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .305 .305 .305 .206 .206 .206 .0564 .0564 .0564
Panel B: NG Oil production
Total index × Monthly Nigerian crude production 1.209*** 1.209*** 1.209*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.141 0.141 0.141
(0.329) (0.329) (0.339) (0.131) (0.132) (0.136) (0.183) (0.183) (0.189)
LGC FE X X X X X X
Time FE X X X
R2 .132 .151 .943 .228 .233 .964 .00875 .00917 .959
Observations 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868 140868
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .305 .305 .305 .206 .206 .206 .0564 .0564 .0564
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the Overall Allocation
determined by the horizontal allocation formula (index) for each local government council; in columns (4)–(6) the Statutory Allocations calculated based on a benchmark oil
price set at the beginning of each year; in columns (7)–(9) the Extraordinary Allocations that are additional revenue transfers from the Excess Crude Account (ECA). The
explanatory variable in Panel (A) is an interaction between the total index weight in the allocation formula times the monthly Brent Crude Oil price; in Panel (B) it is an
interaction between the total index weight times the monthly Nigerian crude oil production. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted to allow for two-way clustering by
LGA level and by time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Robustness of the effect of resource rents on civil conflict without elected LGA’s: Different temporal resolu-
tion of the data
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Annual
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.016 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.040*** 0.002 0.087*** 0.076***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .165 .0793 .0973 .032 .0714 .117 .0401 .00811 .0493 .0824
Panel B: Quarterly
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.177*** 0.095*** 0.136*** 0.018 0.123*** 0.176*** 0.056*** -0.001 0.101*** 0.133***
(0.046) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.041) (0.018) (0.005) (0.027) (0.032)
Observations 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015 17015
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0694 .0287 .0374 .0136 .0282 .0459 .0133 .00282 .0195 .0306
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use
of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving
civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups.
Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged
in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of
actors involved. Panel (A) uses an annual resolution of the data, and Panel (B) a quarter yearly resolution. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Robustness of the effect of resource rents on civil conflict without elected LGA’s: Transformations of Depen-
dent Variable
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.016 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.040*** 0.002 0.087*** 0.076***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .165 .0793 .0973 .032 .0714 .117 .0401 .00811 .0493 .0824
Panel B: Levels
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.669** 0.225** 0.314*** -0.028 0.263** 0.568** 0.111*** 0.004 0.225** 0.295**
(0.274) (0.093) (0.111) (0.044) (0.115) (0.236) (0.034) (0.013) (0.100) (0.130)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .632 .195 .255 .0754 .199 .42 .0705 .0171 .147 .23
Panel C: log(Levels per capita)
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.169*** 0.085*** 0.108*** 0.005 0.101*** 0.152*** 0.049*** 0.001 0.088*** 0.089***
(0.039) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.034) (0.015) (0.005) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV -.279 -.391 -.371 -.437 -.397 -.342 -.433 -.462 -.419 -.386
Panel C: Levels per capita
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.209 0.113* 0.111 -0.052** 0.101 0.227 0.052*** -0.001 0.100 0.104
(0.182) (0.066) (0.076) (0.023) (0.082) (0.163) (0.020) (0.008) (0.072) (0.087)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .407 .129 .163 .0487 .131 .276 .0441 .0104 .0983 .149
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force
by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent
acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the
specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition;
(8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Robustness of effect of resource rents on civil conflict without elected LGA’s: Alternative functional forms to
account for count data
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Allocations 0.942*** 0.296*** 0.419*** 0.044 0.315*** 0.684*** 0.137*** 0.019 0.248*** 0.362***
(0.271) (0.091) (0.102) (0.071) (0.100) (0.215) (0.035) (0.018) (0.088) (0.118)
Observations 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565 4565
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .632 .195 .255 .0754 .199 .42 .0705 .0171 .147 .23
Panel B: Poisson
LGC Allocations 1.054*** 1.349*** 1.335*** 1.898 1.251** 1.269** 1.254*** 0.738 1.655** 1.053**
(0.376) (0.462) (0.481) (1.216) (0.556) (0.497) (0.479) (0.966) (0.774) (0.514)
Observations 2375 1431 1716 746 1347 1859 857 152 978 1410
Number of LGCs 363 218 262 102 202 284 129 23 148 217
Mean of DV 1.21 .623 .678 .461 .675 1.03 .376 .513 .684 .744
Panel C: NB
LGC Allocations 0.360*** 0.890*** 0.731*** 1.743 0.522** 0.277** 1.114*** 0.927 0.601* 0.332*
(0.126) (0.251) (0.204) (1.392) (0.233) (0.136) (0.326) (0.977) (0.351) (0.179)
Observations 2375 1431 1716 746 1347 1859 857 152 978 1410
Number of LGCs 363 218 262 102 202 284 129 23 148 217
Mean of DV 1.21 .623 .678 .461 .675 1.03 .376 .513 .684 .744
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variables throughout are the count number of events
per LGA and year for the period covering 1999-2014. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political
purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by
an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8)
include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local
political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of
actors involved. Panel (B) applies a Poisson estimation, and Panel (C) a Negative-Binomial estimator (NB). Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Robustness of the effect of resource rents on civil conflict without elected LGA’s: Controlling flexibly for
formula inputs
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Population Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.210** 0.167** 0.145** -0.029 0.147** 0.251*** 0.050 -0.005 0.162*** 0.165**
(0.103) (0.068) (0.067) (0.078) (0.066) (0.086) (0.036) (0.009) (0.060) (0.073)
Observations 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632 49632
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0293 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0192 .00496 .00105 .00768 .0127
Panel B: Landmass Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.144** 0.027 0.091** 0.019 0.051 0.113* 0.032 -0.013 0.025 0.084*
(0.073) (0.038) (0.046) (0.033) (0.042) (0.058) (0.024) (0.009) (0.036) (0.050)
Observations 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0293 .0112 .0152 .00472 .0108 .0192 .00496 .00105 .00768 .0127
Panel C: Public Good Access Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.225*** 0.108* 0.099* 0.034 0.103* 0.172** 0.065** -0.011 0.082 0.092
(0.085) (0.057) (0.057) (0.035) (0.055) (0.069) (0.029) (0.009) (0.050) (0.061)
Observations 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652 49652
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0192 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel D: Water supply spread Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.144** 0.027 0.091** 0.019 0.051 0.113* 0.032 -0.013 0.025 0.084*
(0.073) (0.038) (0.046) (0.033) (0.042) (0.058) (0.024) (0.009) (0.036) (0.050)
Observations 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618 49618
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0293 .0112 .0152 .00472 .0108 .0192 .00496 .00105 .00768 .0127
Panel E: Hospital beds Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.233*** 0.122** 0.141*** 0.021 0.119** 0.193*** 0.069** -0.010 0.100** 0.124**
(0.076) (0.048) (0.050) (0.032) (0.047) (0.062) (0.027) (0.007) (0.043) (0.055)
Observations 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647 49647
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0192 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with
a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group
against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to
influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns
(9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. Each panel uses specific allocation formula sub-index deciles interacted with time fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Alternative conflict data
ACLED UCDP GED GTD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Events Fatalities Non Boko Haram Events Fatalities Events Fatalities
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.362*** 0.291*** 0.147*** 0.213*** 0.171*** 0.220*** 0.199***
(0.086) (0.069) (0.037) (0.067) (0.057) (0.067) (0.064)
Observations 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0294 .0163 .0134 .0114 .00844 .0121 .0107
Panel B: Levels
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.828*** 8.581*** 0.180*** 0.505** 5.054** 0.505** 6.737*
(0.303) (3.047) (0.054) (0.225) (2.415) (0.213) (3.476)
Observations 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0526 .291 .0171 .0258 .149 .0234 .269
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns
(1)–(3) is based on the ACLED data; in columns (4)–(5) on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Event Data, and in
columns (6)–(7) on the Global Terrorism Database. Columns (1), (4), and (6) indicate any conflict event; columns (2), (5), and (7)
indicate the number of fatalities in conflict; column (3) only includes conflict events that are not associated with the Jihadist militant
organization “Boko Haram” in northeastern Nigeria. The explanatory variable captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local
government council. Panel (A) reports results for any conflict event, and Panel (B) conflict levels. Standard errors in parentheses are
adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A8: LGA Extraordinary Allocations and Conflict
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Extra Allocations 0.108** 0.048 0.042** 0.037 0.032 0.086*** 0.009 -0.014 0.027 0.055**
(0.045) (0.030) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) (0.013) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: IV
LGC Extra Allocations 0.662** 0.244** 0.386** 0.105 0.297** 0.488** 0.146** -0.010 0.211* 0.311**
(0.276) (0.122) (0.156) (0.082) (0.141) (0.212) (0.072) (0.021) (0.111) (0.156)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64 12.64
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined
as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence
involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised
groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious)
groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific
dyadic interaction of actors involved. The explanatory variable is the extraordinary allocation to each local government council from the Excess Crude Account (ECA) on a monthly
basis. Extraordinary allocations are based on idiosyncratic political decisions. The instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index weight interacted with the oil price as
instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A9: Conflict in Oil-Producing States and Oil Fields
Type of Event Groups involved Between pol militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol Militia Comm militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Oil producing state
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.255*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.018 0.143*** 0.220*** 0.070** -0.004 0.119** 0.139**
(0.088) (0.054) (0.056) (0.038) (0.053) (0.073) (0.029) (0.004) (0.048) (0.064)
LGA is in Oil Producing State × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.118 -0.174* 0.043 -0.007 -0.162 -0.140 -0.035 -0.042 -0.134 -0.016
(0.178) (0.095) (0.095) (0.092) (0.102) (0.125) (0.042) (0.045) (0.083) (0.088)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: LGA with Oil field
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.236*** 0.116** 0.154*** 0.016 0.118** 0.200*** 0.065** -0.009 0.099** 0.137**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.051) (0.034) (0.046) (0.062) (0.027) (0.007) (0.042) (0.055)
LGA has Oil Field × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.040 -0.002 -0.006 0.037 0.024 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.000 -0.014
(0.055) (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.026) (0.037) (0.028) (0.008) (0.017) (0.024)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects, state governor fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by
a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political
group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents
to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns
(9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. In Panel (A) the monthly statutory allocation are interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether a LGA is in a state that has any oil-producing
facilities; in Panel (B) it is interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether a LGA has any oil field. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A10: Robustness: Removing election related violence from estimating sample
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Removing 1 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.217*** 0.111** 0.150*** 0.012 0.112*** 0.189*** 0.062** -0.014 0.096** 0.141***
(0.073) (0.044) (0.049) (0.031) (0.043) (0.060) (0.025) (0.009) (0.039) (0.052)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.134* -0.086* -0.090* -0.002 -0.080* -0.134** -0.052** 0.025*** -0.081** -0.108**
(0.073) (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.044) (0.060) (0.023) (0.009) (0.040) (0.050)
Observations 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0236 .00888 .011 .00504 .00827 .0131 .00484 .000973 .00478 .00822
Panel B: Removing 3 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.237*** 0.118** 0.165*** 0.013 0.119** 0.204*** 0.076*** -0.014 0.102** 0.149***
(0.080) (0.047) (0.053) (0.034) (0.047) (0.065) (0.027) (0.010) (0.043) (0.056)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.151* -0.093* -0.102* -0.007 -0.080 -0.148** -0.068*** 0.026** -0.081* -0.117**
(0.080) (0.050) (0.054) (0.044) (0.049) (0.066) (0.024) (0.010) (0.045) (0.056)
Observations 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0237 .00894 .011 .00511 .00828 .0132 .00484 .000966 .0048 .00827
Panel C: Removing 6 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.287*** 0.144*** 0.192*** 0.029 0.144*** 0.243*** 0.089*** -0.011 0.122** 0.166***
(0.083) (0.054) (0.055) (0.037) (0.053) (0.068) (0.029) (0.010) (0.048) (0.059)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.200** -0.112* -0.127** -0.024 -0.087 -0.188*** -0.076*** 0.025** -0.097* -0.136**
(0.084) (0.058) (0.053) (0.049) (0.058) (0.070) (0.026) (0.010) (0.053) (0.059)
Observations 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0237 .0089 .011 .00525 .00822 .0131 .00492 .000933 .00474 .00831
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a
political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against
unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence
political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10)
present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. Panel (A) removes the month when a local council election is held from the sample; Panel (B) removes a three months window from the sample; Panel
(C) removes a six months window from the sample. LGC Statutory Allocations the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or
appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A11: Variance Decomposition of Local Democracy
Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R-squared .0817 .571 .672 .972
LGC FE X X X X
Time FE X X
State Governor FE X
State x Time FE X
Observations 148428 148428 143930 148428
Number of LGCs
Notes: Table presents a decomposition of the variation in the elec-
tion status dummy variable after controlling for different levels of
fixed effects.
Table A12: Residual Variation to Hold Local Elections: Allocations and Conflict
Allocations ACLED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LGC Allocations -0.006 0.046
(0.018) (0.078)
LGC Extra Allocations -0.017 -0.050
(0.023) (0.086)
LGC Allocations (last 3 months) -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
LGC Allocations (last 6 months) -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005)
LGC Allocations (last 12 months) -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004)
ACLED events (last 3 months) -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
ACLED events (last 6 months) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
ACLED events (last 12 months) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 .967 .967 .967 .966 .966 .967 .967 .967 .966
Observations 140713 140713 138406 136099 131485 148428 148428 148428 131485
Notes: The table presents a series of regressions of the elected status indicator variable (Elected) on the different types of allocations for
different periods prior to local elections, and conflict events prior to local elections. The residuals in the Elected variable are calculated after
controlling for state by time fixed effects and local government (LGA) fixed effects. Column (9) presents the estimation with all relevant
explanatory variables included. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A13: Residual Variation in Local Elections: Formula Inputs and Ethnicity
Weather Index and Geography Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Temperature -0.002 -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
Rainfall (annual avg) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)






Rain - Water supply spread -44.413 0.000
(249.069) (.)
LGA has Oil Field 0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.006)
Non-aligned ethnic family 0.010 0.014
(0.007) (0.009)
Non-aligned ethnic group 0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
Share of LGC population non-aligned w. Gov. religion -0.005 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
R2 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .966 .966 .967 .968
Observations 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 131107 131107 126187 123947
Notes: The table presents a series of regressions of the elected status indicator variable (Elected) on two weather indicators in columns (1)–(2), temperature and annual rainfall, on the allocation
index and its sub-indices in columns (3)–(6), on an LGA oil field indicator in column (7), and on three ethnic/religious alignment variables in columns (8)–(10), indicating what share of the
population is aligned with the state governor’s ethnicity and religion, respectively. Column (10) includes all covariates. The residuals in the Elected variable are calculated after controlling for state
by time fixed effects and local government (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table A14: Robustness: Controlling for State-Governor Specific LGA Fixed Effects
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: without elected LGCs
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.146** 0.079** 0.081* 0.007 0.047 0.116** 0.039 -0.016 0.041 0.098**
(0.067) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.037) (0.052) (0.030) (0.012) (0.034) (0.049)
Observations 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644 49644
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0192 .00496 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: with elected LGCs
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.116*** 0.027 0.052* -0.013 0.013 0.092*** 0.031 -0.003 0.019 0.060**
(0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.022) (0.007) (0.026) (0.030)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.030 0.001 -0.019 0.013 0.006 -0.043 -0.015 0.009* -0.017 -0.041*
(0.035) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.017) (0.005) (0.018) (0.023)
Observations 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0233 .00895 .011 .00471 .00808 .013 .00489 .000982 .00474 .00812
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and separate LGA fixed effects for each state governor. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the
use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are
violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the
specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels
are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. Panel (A) presents estimation results
for periods with an appointed local government council (LGC), and Panel (B) includes periods with an elected LGC. The main explanatory variable is the monthly allocation to a LGC. The variable
Elected indicates whether a LGC is elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A15: LGA Extraordinary Allocations and Conflict
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Extra Allocations 0.077** 0.046* 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.074*** -0.009 -0.013* 0.025 0.042**
(0.034) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Elected × LGC Extra Allocations -0.038 -0.037 -0.014 0.000 -0.030 -0.061* 0.007 0.015** -0.037 -0.028*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.013) (0.009) (0.027) (0.032) (0.010) (0.007) (0.022) (0.016)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: IV
LGC Extra Allocations 0.563** 0.231** 0.324** 0.079 0.299** 0.441** 0.100 -0.018 0.208** 0.293**
(0.252) (0.109) (0.147) (0.068) (0.137) (0.196) (0.061) (0.025) (0.101) (0.146)
Elected × LGC Extra Allocations -0.421** -0.208** -0.208* -0.069 -0.277** -0.341** -0.087 0.038 -0.201** -0.220*
(0.208) (0.096) (0.123) (0.070) (0.128) (0.167) (0.056) (0.026) (0.096) (0.128)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: All regressions control for local government area (LGA) fixed effects and state by time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of
force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are
violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include
the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition;
(8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Extra
Allocations indicates the extraordinary allocations to each local government council from the Excess Crude Account (ECA) on a monthly basis. Extraordinary allocations are based on idiosyncratic
political decisions. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index
weight interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A16: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Alternative conflict data
ACLED UCDP GED GTD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Events Fatalities Non Boko Haram Events Fatalities Events Fatalities
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.279*** 0.206*** 0.100*** 0.166*** 0.140*** 0.159*** 0.144***
(0.061) (0.045) (0.027) (0.046) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.063** -0.060*** -0.030*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.068***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .0121 .0106 .00703 .00465 .00767 .00671
Panel B: Levels
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.642*** 5.705*** 0.122*** 0.424** 3.444** 0.344*** 4.509*
(0.190) (1.825) (0.036) (0.186) (1.411) (0.121) (2.601)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.143 -3.017*** -0.044*** -0.224** -2.257*** -0.186*** -3.160***
(0.098) (1.049) (0.016) (0.100) (0.865) (0.062) (1.192)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0405 .224 .0134 .0133 .0735 .0127 .189
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is
based on the ACLED data; in columns (4)–(5) on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Event Data, and in columns (6)–(7) on the Global
Terrorism Database. Columns (1), (4), and (6) indicate any conflict event; columns (2), (5), and (7) indicate the number of fatalities in conflict; column
(3) only includes conflict events that are not associated with the Jihadist militant organization “Boko Haram” in northeastern Nigeria. The variable
LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local
government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panel (A) reports results for any conflict event, and Panel (B) conflict levels. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A17: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Different transformations of dependent variables
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.018* 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.019* 0.005 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.022*** -0.008 -0.023*** 0.007 -0.021*** -0.023*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .139 .0689 .079 .0341 .0599 .0889 .0415 .00728 .0366 .0614
Panel B: Levels
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.626*** 0.174*** 0.252*** 0.071 0.218*** 0.427*** 0.079** 0.010 0.166*** 0.227***
(0.192) (0.062) (0.072) (0.059) (0.071) (0.145) (0.035) (0.008) (0.059) (0.080)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.130 -0.069** -0.089*** 0.048 -0.070** -0.201*** 0.011 -0.000 -0.084*** -0.106***
(0.079) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.059) (0.014) (0.003) (0.027) (0.031)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .516 .153 .189 .0968 .149 .262 .0875 .0145 .0868 .142
Panel C: log(Levels per capita)
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.121*** 0.053*** 0.082*** 0.019 0.072*** 0.102*** 0.027** 0.005 0.059*** 0.068***
(0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.032*** -0.016** -0.029*** 0.011 -0.023*** -0.042*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV -.315 -.412 -.4 -.443 -.419 -.386 -.439 -.473 -.444 -.42
Panel C: Levels per capita
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.173 0.082** 0.079* -0.019 0.078* 0.156* 0.034** 0.003 0.071* 0.076
(0.108) (0.039) (0.044) (0.024) (0.047) (0.093) (0.016) (0.004) (0.040) (0.049)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.091* -0.043** -0.049** 0.013 -0.048** -0.108*** 0.002 0.001 -0.050*** -0.054***
(0.048) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.041) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .31 .0952 .116 .0534 .0898 .166 .0529 .00816 .0563 .0892
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group
with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized
political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political
militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an
established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocations to each
local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A18: Different temporal resolution of the data
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Annual
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.018* 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.019* 0.005 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.022*** -0.008 -0.023*** 0.007 -0.021*** -0.023*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .139 .0689 .079 .0341 .0599 .0889 .0415 .00728 .0366 .0614
Panel B: Quarterly
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.136*** 0.062*** 0.107*** 0.025 0.090*** 0.129*** 0.040*** 0.006 0.071*** 0.092***
(0.031) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.023)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.022* -0.018** -0.030*** 0.014 -0.025*** -0.047*** 0.002 0.000 -0.032*** -0.038***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476 49476
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0566 .0236 .0287 .0133 .0218 .0327 .0134 .00251 .0127 .0212
Panel C: Monthly
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.279*** 0.104*** 0.178*** 0.033 0.133*** 0.232*** 0.050** 0.006 0.104*** 0.161***
(0.061) (0.031) (0.036) (0.026) (0.032) (0.051) (0.020) (0.004) (0.027) (0.041)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.063** -0.040** -0.060*** 0.026 -0.032* -0.103*** 0.003 0.002 -0.050*** -0.077***
(0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.002) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group
with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized
political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6)
political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to
counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue
allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panel (A) reports results for an annual
resolution of the data, Panel (B) for a quarter yearly resolution, and Panel (C) for a monthly resolution. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A19: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Alternative functional forms to account for count data
Type of Event Groups involved Between pol militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol Militia Comm militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Allocations 0.853*** 0.220*** 0.343*** 0.134** 0.266*** 0.530*** 0.111*** 0.011 0.193*** 0.290***
(0.211) (0.068) (0.079) (0.066) (0.072) (0.156) (0.041) (0.010) (0.060) (0.087)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.147* -0.075*** -0.093*** 0.043 -0.075** -0.207*** 0.010 -0.002 -0.086*** -0.108***
(0.076) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.058) (0.014) (0.003) (0.026) (0.031)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .516 .153 .189 .0968 .149 .262 .0875 .0145 .0868 .142
Panel B: Poisson
LGC Allocations 0.430** 0.459 0.601** 0.153 0.312 0.568* 0.382 1.005** 0.459 0.597*
(0.208) (0.284) (0.295) (0.186) (0.253) (0.318) (0.405) (0.493) (0.433) (0.352)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.071 -0.129 -0.152 0.010 -0.129 -0.211** 0.119 0.104 -0.224 -0.218**
(0.081) (0.107) (0.100) (0.073) (0.109) (0.101) (0.135) (0.260) (0.143) (0.109)
Observations 8257 5498 6215 3114 4999 6452 4234 736 3578 5143
Number of LGCs 517 344 389 195 313 404 265 46 224 322
Mean of DV .773 .344 .376 .384 .368 .501 .256 .243 .3 .342
Panel C: NB
LGC Allocations 0.160** 0.176* 0.320*** 0.263 0.229** 0.207** 0.116 0.629 0.260* 0.314***
(0.066) (0.095) (0.097) (0.173) (0.103) (0.086) (0.117) (0.506) (0.141) (0.119)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.062 -0.038 -0.102* 0.051 -0.115* -0.089 0.043 0.009 -0.165* -0.139**
(0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.082) (0.066) (0.054) (0.087) (0.256) (0.088) (0.066)
Observations 8257 5498 6215 3114 4999 6452 4234 736 3578 5143
Number of LGCs 517 344 389 195 313 404 265 46 224 322
Mean of DV .773 .344 .376 .384 .368 .501 .256 .243 .3 .342
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variables throughout are the count number of events per LGA
and year for the period covering 1999-2014. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of
events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group
against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6)
political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political
organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Allocations captures
the monthly revenue allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panel (B)
employs a Poisson estimation, and Panel (C) a negative-binomial estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A20: Robustness: Controlling flexibly for formula inputs
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Population Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.096 0.117** 0.117* -0.075 0.098* 0.160** 0.022 -0.012 0.115*** 0.134**
(0.090) (0.053) (0.061) (0.059) (0.052) (0.071) (0.033) (0.010) (0.044) (0.062)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.099 -0.086* -0.075 0.007 -0.090* -0.131* -0.031 0.029** -0.094** -0.115**
(0.080) (0.044) (0.058) (0.051) (0.050) (0.067) (0.022) (0.013) (0.045) (0.057)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: Landmass Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.185** 0.079** 0.113** 0.019 0.098** 0.149** 0.044* -0.014 0.062* 0.118**
(0.072) (0.038) (0.050) (0.032) (0.041) (0.058) (0.024) (0.009) (0.034) (0.050)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.110 -0.061 -0.065 -0.007 -0.064 -0.100* -0.042** 0.029*** -0.057 -0.094*
(0.067) (0.038) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.018) (0.011) (0.038) (0.049)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel C: Public Good Access Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.198** 0.109** 0.102** 0.018 0.111** 0.166*** 0.052** -0.014 0.089** 0.112**
(0.076) (0.046) (0.052) (0.032) (0.044) (0.062) (0.025) (0.009) (0.039) (0.053)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.123* -0.083* -0.050 -0.012 -0.080* -0.113* -0.044** 0.027*** -0.076* -0.085*
(0.071) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.059) (0.020) (0.010) (0.040) (0.051)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel D: Water supply spread Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.185** 0.079** 0.113** 0.019 0.098** 0.149** 0.044* -0.014 0.062* 0.118**
(0.072) (0.038) (0.050) (0.032) (0.041) (0.058) (0.024) (0.009) (0.034) (0.050)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.110 -0.061 -0.065 -0.007 -0.064 -0.100* -0.042** 0.029*** -0.057 -0.094*
(0.067) (0.038) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.018) (0.011) (0.038) (0.049)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel E: Hospital beds Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.206*** 0.114*** 0.139*** 0.007 0.118*** 0.180*** 0.055** -0.010 0.095** 0.134***
(0.071) (0.043) (0.048) (0.029) (0.041) (0.059) (0.024) (0.008) (0.038) (0.050)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.129* -0.081* -0.087* -0.004 -0.083* -0.128** -0.044** 0.026*** -0.081** -0.112**
(0.067) (0.041) (0.047) (0.038) (0.042) (0.057) (0.019) (0.009) (0.039) (0.049)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a
political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against
unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence
political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10)
present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local
government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panels (A)–(E) control flexibly for the various allocation formula sub-indices defined by the Federation Account Allocation Committee. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A21: Validation of measure of exclusion of ethnic groups
Alignment with ethnic group of state governor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Own ethnic group treated unfairly (dummy)
Person not aligned with governor’s ethnicity 0.046*** 0.034** 0.042*** 0.026*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 15980 15980 15978 15978
Number of LGCs 579 579 577 577
Mean of DV .803 .803 .803 .803
Panel B: Own ethnic group treated unfairly
Person not aligned with governor’s ethnicity 0.117*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.045
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038)
Observations 15980 15980 15978 15978
Number of LGCs 579 579 577 577
Mean of DV 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32
State FE X X
LGA FE X X
Time FE X X
Notes: The explanatory variable measures whether a respondent perceives the own ethnic group treated unfairly on a 4-
point likert scale (Panel A), or at least sometimes (Panel B) to be treated unfairly by the government. The dependent variable
indicates whether a respondent is of the same ethnic group as the state governor. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A22: LGA Allocations and Grievances towards National Political Institutions
Approval of MP National MP’s are corrupt Trust in National Assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.163 -0.161 0.067 0.040 -0.169 -0.162
(0.117) (0.112) (0.135) (0.135) (0.118) (0.128)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.044 0.042 0.115 0.128 0.033 0.034
(0.100) (0.095) (0.101) (0.101) (0.087) (0.090)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.080 -0.077 0.023 0.008 -0.081 -0.078
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.066) (0.057) (0.060)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.026 0.024 0.048 0.055 0.017 0.018
(0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.059 -0.055 0.020 0.011 -0.058 -0.055
(0.038) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.021 0.019 0.027 0.031 0.015 0.015
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates how
much a respondent approves of the performance of the Members of Parliament at the federal government level; in columns (3)–(4) it captures perception of
corruption of Members of Parliament; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trusts the National Assembly. The variable Elected indicates whether
a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include the respondents age, educational attainment, employment
status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A23: LGA Allocations and Grievances towards State level Political institu-
tions
Approval State Governor State Assembly corrupt Trust State governor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.660* -0.235 1.613 1.393 -0.292 -0.316
(0.400) (0.373) (1.600) (1.549) (0.271) (0.303)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.120 -0.074 0.170 0.081 0.126 0.174
(0.311) (0.271) (1.746) (1.720) (0.226) (0.259)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.288 -0.090 -0.841 -0.678 -0.119 -0.130
(0.190) (0.176) (2.328) (2.526) (0.123) (0.139)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.044 -0.042 0.644 0.516 0.048 0.071
(0.145) (0.127) (0.973) (1.003) (0.103) (0.119)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.195 -0.073 1.447 1.202 -0.090 -0.097
(0.122) (0.111) (1.008) (0.983) (0.080) (0.089)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.027 -0.026 0.312 0.290 0.044 0.059
(0.094) (0.081) (0.606) (0.607) (0.066) (0.076)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates how
much a respondent approves of the performance of the State Governor; in columns (3)–(4) it captures perception of corruption among members of the State
assembly; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trust the state governor. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is
elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include the respondents age, educational attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator
whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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